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Recently, low-wage, non-union workers have staged noteworthy protests and 
job actions against allegedly inferior working conditions.  Protests against Wal-
Mart, strikes against fast food restaurants, and immigration rallies by 
unauthorized workers offer ready examples.1  In these protests and job actions, 
various non-union labor advocacy groups, sometimes collectively denoted as 
                                                            
 + Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law.  B.A. 1991, West Chester University 
of Pennsylvania; J.D. 1995, Harvard Law School.  I would like to thank Victoria Klein, Eli Naduris-
Weissman, Michael Oswalt, and Paul Secunda for the helpful comments and suggestions.  All 
errors are mine. 
 1. See, e.g., Raya Zimmerman, St. Paul: 26 Arrested in Black Friday Protests Over Low 
Retail Wages, TWIN CITIES, Nov. 29, 2013, http://www.twincities.com/ci_24625449/st-paul-26-
arrested-black-friday-protests-over (describing the march of hundreds on behalf of “janitors and 
retail employees” in front of a Wal-Mart). 
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“ALT-labor,”2 have often organized the involved workers.3  Whether these kinds 
of actions represent the leading edge of a broader, discontented precariat—“the 
most insecure workers in an economy and a much talked about group among 
labor economists”—remains to be seen.4  The increase in ALT-labor activity and 
its evolving coordination, whatever their causes, is evident.5 
This Article addresses legal problems that might arise from ALT-labor 
coordination, which occurs when one ALT-labor group protests on behalf of or 
assists another such group.6  Imagine, for example, a situation in which 
OURWalmart members7 participate in a protest organized by Fast Food 
                                                            
 2. “ALT-labor” groups are “entities outside of the traditional organizing model” that unions 
typically implement.  “Alt-Labor”, WORKERCENTERS, http://workercenters.com/labors-loophole/ 
alt-labor/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2014).  These groups formed “[i]n response to declines in popularity 
and failures to organize workers in the nation’s growing service industries . . . .”  Id.  “The strategies 
of A[LT]-[l]abor groups resemble those of normal unions and their pre-1930s predecessors[,]” 
including “[p]rotesting worksites, organizing boycotts, and engaging in ‘wildcat strikes’—
unauthorized, intermittent walkouts targeted to cause maximum disruptions to business operations 
. . . .”  Id.  Because ALT-labor, especially worker centers, actually pre-dates the existence of unions 
or modern labor statutes, it logically follows that as modern labor law is dismantled, earlier 
prototypes of collective labor groups are emerging.  See David Rosenfeld, Worker Centers: 
Emerging Labor Organizations–Until they Confront the National Labor Relations Act, 27 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & L. LAW 469, 472–74 (2006). 
 3. Some of the groups operate within an entire industry, such as Restaurant Opportunities 
Center, the New York Taxi Drivers’ Alliance, and Domestic Workers United.  See Josh Eidelson, 
ALT-Labor, AM. PROSPECT, Jan. 29, 2013, http://prospect.org/article/ALT-Labor.  Others operate 
on the basis of religious or racial justice motivations.  See e.g., Home, NEW ORLEANS WORKERS’ 
CENTER FOR RACIAL JUST., http://nowcrj.org (last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (exemplifying a group 
representing racial interests in the labor community); Mission, ARISE CHI., http://arisechicago.org/ 
(last visited Aug. 24, 2014) (illustrating a group organized around religious beliefs).  The group 
OURWalmart is an example of a single-employer group, which has staged work stoppages against 
Wal-Mart.  See Josh Eidelson, Breaking: Wal-Mart Workers on Strike, Defying Firings, SALON 
(Oct. 18, 2013, 12:20 PM), http://www.salon.com/2013/10/18/breaking_wal_mart_workers_ 
on_strike_in_florida/ (identifying the group as a “non-union labor group closely tied to the United 
Food & Commercial Workers union[]”).  See generally JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS: 
ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006) (providing a brief review of the 
broad array of worker center structures); Alan Hyde, New Institutions for Worker Representation 
in the United States: Some Theoretical Issues, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 385 (2006) (discussing new 
forms of labor institutions). 
 4. Robyn E. Blumner, The Precariat and Fair Wages, TAMPA BAY TIMES, Aug. 2, 2013, 
http://web.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/blumner-the-precariat-and-fair-wages/2134471. 
 5. As this Article went to print, a national wave of fast food worker strikes reportedly 
involving thousands of workers advocating a fifteen dollar minimum wage was underway.  See 
Steven Greenhouse, Hundreds of Fast-Food Workers Striking for Higher Wages Are Arrested, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 4, 2014, at B3 (describing the arrest of “nearly 500 protesters” in “about 150 cities 
nationwide” following sit-ins by many “fast-food workers and labor allies . . . .”). 
 6. See Phil Wilson, Why Union Members Should be Up in Arms Over “Alt-Labor”, LAB. 
RELATIONS INST. (last visited Aug. 24, 2014), http://lrionline.com/labor-relations-insight-3 
(explaining that ALT-labor “groups focus . . . on organizing worker populations independent from 
companies.”). 
 7. Per OURWalmart’s website, the group’s mission is “to ensure that every Associate [of 
Wal-Mart], regardless of his or her title, age, race, or sex, is respected at WalMart.”  About Us, 
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Forward8 at the premises of a fast food restaurant.  Imagine further that the 
OURWalmart members attempt to persuade fast food workers to strike or 
customers not to enter the restaurant.  In such circumstances, OURWalmart 
could incur serious legal liability under labor law’s obscure and complicated 
“secondary boycott” rules.9  These rules in essence prohibit “labor 
organizations” involved in a labor dispute from pressuring “neutrals” to a labor 
dispute in specific, proscribed ways.10  Thus, if OURWalmart has a dispute with 
Wal-Mart, any pressure it applies to a neutral fast food restaurant could be 
subjected to legal scrutiny.11 
Secondary boycott complications are made more likely by the recent 
escalation of non-union ALT-labor activity.12  Recent fast food worker strikes, 
led by groups like Fast Food Forward, are a prime example of ALT-labor in 
action.  On August 29, 2013, workers in sixty cities walked off the job, a 
significant labor development that followed a series of smaller such strikes 
earlier in that year.13  The strikes were conducted at McDonald’s, Burger King’s, 
and Kentucky Fried Chicken’s restaurants, and extended to the Southern United 
States, historically a region hostile to traditional labor union organizing.14  The 
impact of the strikes was mixed: “[s]ome targeted restaurants were temporarily 
unable to do business because they had too few employees, and others seemingly 
operated normally.”15  A second wave of similar strikes occurred in about 100 
                                                            
OURWALMART, http://forrespect.org/our-walmart/about-us/ (last visited Aug. 24, 2014).  The 
group’s members “join together to offer strength and support in addressing the challenges that arise 
in our stores and our company every day.”  Id. 
 8. “Fast Food Forward is a movement of NYC fast food workers to raise wages and gain 
rights at work” which is “part of the national movement of low-wage workers fighting for a better 
future.”  FAST FOOD FORWARD, http://fastfoodforward.org/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
 9. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (2006) (designating that forcing workers to participate in 
strikes can be classified as an “unfair labor practice”). 
 10. See infra Part I.A (discussing secondary boycotts). 
 11. This principle also applies across separate employers within the same industry, for as will 
be shown, see infra Part I.A, the statute very broadly prohibits the pressuring of neutral employers.  
Thus, if Burger King employees apply pressure to change the labor policies of McDonald’s, a 
secondary boycott problem could arise.  As this Article goes to print, fast food workers continue to 
engage in and plan multiemployer work stoppages within the fast food industry and have even 
gathered in Illinois for a two-day convention to refine strategies for such coordination.  Jessica 
Wohl, Fast Food Workers Plan Civil Disobedience in Minimum Wage Fight, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 2, 
2014, http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/chi-fast-food-strike-20140901-story.html. 
 12. See Trey Kovacs, Big Labor and NLRB Tactics Evolve, WORKPLACECHOICE (July 30, 
2013), http://workplacechoice.org/2013/07/30/big-labor-and-nlrb-tactics-evolve/ (describing the 
“proliferation” of ALT-labor groups). 
 13. Atossa Araxia Abrahamian, U.S. Fast-Food Workers Protest, Demand A ‘Living Wage’, 
REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-usa-restaurants-strike-
idUSBRE97S05320130829. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Candice Choi, Fast-Food Workers Stage Largest Protests Yet, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 
29, 2013), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/fast-food-protests-under-way. 
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U.S. cities in December 2013.16  The “days without immigrants” rallies of 2006 
provide another example of widespread ALT-labor protest.17  Immigration 
issues intensified in the early months of that year following news of a federal 
legislative proposal that essentially would have classified all employees working 
without required immigration documentation as felons.18  In reaction to the 
proposed legislation, a variety of ALT-labor groups, and others, coordinated and 
organized mass rallies across the U.S.19  The participants included authorized 
and unauthorized workers and various allies and supporters of unauthorized 
workers.20  Work in many locations stopped as workers joined the protests while 
the rallies were underway.21 
The various campaigns against Wal-Mart represent another well-known area 
of ALT-labor activity.  The “Black Friday” protests, organized by 
OURWalmart, are probably the most widely known of these campaigns.22  
Finally, there has been a recent groundswell of strike activity by low-wage 
employees of federal government contractors.  For example, the group Good 
                                                            
 16. John Bacon, Fast-Food Workers Strike, Protest for Higher Pay, USA TODAY (Dec. 5, 
2013, 12:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/12/05/fast-food-strike-
wages/3877023/.  As noted in the New York Times, businesses are paying attention to ALT-labor 
activity.  See Steven Greenhouse, Advocates for Workers Raise the Ire of Business, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 16, 2014, at B1 (claiming that the activities of ALT-labor groups are “start[ing] to get on 
businesses’ nerves . . . .”). 
 17. See Michael C. Duff, Days Without Immigrants: Analysis and Implications of 
Immigration Rallies under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 93, 93, 95 (2007) 
(discussing the traditional labor law connotations of the rallies). 
 18. See, e.g., Monica Davey, For Immigrants and Business, Rift on Protests, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 15, 2006, at A1 [herinafter Davey, For Immigrants and Business] (referencing a Bonita 
Springs, Florida “rally against legislation in Congress cracking down on illegal immigrants”); 
Monica Davey, With Calls for Boycott by Immigrants, Employers Gird for Unknown, N.Y. TIMES, 
May 1, 2006, at A12 [herinafter Davey, With Calls for Boycott] (making note of “immigration 
demonstrations around the country . . . .”).  Attendance at a rally held on March 25, 2006 in Los 
Angeles was estimated at 500,000 protesters.  See Jim Newton, Villaraigosa Tells Where He Stands, 
L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2006, A1 (noting “500,000 people marched in peace . . . .”).  See also Ines 
Ferre et al., Thousands March for Immigrant Rights: Schools, Businesses Feel Impact as Students, 
Workers Walk Out, CNN (May 1, 2006, 10:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/05/01 
/immigrant.day/index.html (last visited February 12, 2007) (explaining that “organizers arranged a 
human chain”). 
 19. See Ferre, supra note 18 (noting that major cities such as New York, Washington, Miami, 
Chicago, San Francisco, and Atlanta were rally hubs). 
 20. See Davey, With Calls for Boycott, supra note 18 (acknowledging that “immigrant rights 
groups and others were calling on workers and employers to join” the rallies). 
 21. See Carol McKinley et al., ‘A Day Without Immigrants’, FOX NEWS (May 1, 2006), 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2006/05/01/day-without-immigrants/ (noting that “[p]rotesters 
boycotted work” in locations “across America”). 
 22. See Zimmerman, supra note 1 (describing that the protesters held marches on Black 
Friday to garner attention). 
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Jobs Nation,23 in conjunction with a group of unions, coordinated a strike in 
January 2014 against Pentagon contractors.24 
From the perspective of businesses, the commercial problem presented by 
non-union ALT-labor protests—particularly coordinated protests involving 
multiple employers—is identical to that presented by traditional union protests: 
workplaces may be shut down and customers may be unable to access businesses 
while the protests are in progress, which directly threatens commercial activity.25  
Public relations considerations also come into play.  Typically, ALT-labor 
protesters claim employers treat them unfairly.26  The potential for negative 
public relations in reaction to the protests is real.27  The negative perception of 
a business by potential customers, and others in the community, could harm its 
goodwill or other intangible assets.28  Nevertheless, some commentators argue 
that business interests do not care about the disruptions or perceptions labor 
protests create, because investors do not care.29  Historically, however, business 
interests have cared about such volatility,30 and have usually desired the prompt 
                                                            
 23. The group describes itself as “workers . . . employed by private companies through federal 
contracts, concessions and leases.”  About Us, GOOD JOBS NATION, http://goodjobsnation.org/# 
about (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
 24. Josh Eidelson, Breaking: Pentagon Workers Strike Over Poverty Pay, SALON (Jan. 22, 
2014, 9:00 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/01/22/breaking_pentagon_workers_strike_over_ 
poverty_pay/.                                                                                                                                                 
 25. From its inception, federal labor policy centered on prevention of such threats to the 
economy.  See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006) (explaining that 
employers’ denial of the right of employees to organize can cause “strikes and other forms of 
industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing 
commerce . . . .”). 
 26. See Theodore J. St. Antoine, Keynote Address: The Moral Dimension of Employment 
Dispute Resolution, 86 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 391, 402 (describing that “the . . . unequal bargaining 
power” of the parties involved in an employer-employee conflict “implicates moral values 
profoundly”). 
 27. This explains why the risk of labor disputes is routinely included as “forward looking 
information” on major corporations’ financial statements involving future risks and uncertainties.  
See, e.g., Investors, POOLCORP (Nov. 1, 2013), http://ir.poolcorp.com/profiles/investor/Res 
LibraryView.asp?BzID=603&ResLibraryID=66095&Category=43 (acknowledging that such 
statements are allowed under “the safe harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995”). 
 28. James J. Brudney, Collateral Conflict: Employer Claims of RICO Extortion Against 
Union Comprehensive Campaigns, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 731, 775 (2010).  Indeed, employers will 
allege violations of RICO by unions, premised on interferences with employers’ intangible 
“property,” such as goodwill and reputation.  Id. at 775–76.  However, some scholars question the 
merit of these claims.  See, e.g., id. at 776. 
 29. See, e.g., Brian Solomon, Memo to the Fast Food Minimum Wage Strikers: Investors 
Don’t Care, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2013, 4:46 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2013/ 
12/05/fast-food-investors-not-scared-of-minimum-wage-worker-strike/ (stating that “investors 
don’t seem to be particularly scared of [] strikers, nor their chances at getting the minimum wage 
increase they seek”). 
 30. For example, the involvement of business lobbyist Richard Berman in the controversy 
belies the notion that businesses are unconcerned.  See Greenhouse, supra note 16 (noting that 
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suppression of labor protests.31  This Article discusses one method business 
might employ to achieve suppression: bringing legal actions against protestors 
on the theory that the ALT-labor coordination constitutes unlawful secondary 
boycotts.32 
In reality, the dispute between employers and ALT-labor has already begun.  
On November 16, 2012, Wal-Mart filed an unfair labor practice charge against 
the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union alleging that the 
union had engaged in unlawful picketing.33  Although the theory of unlawfulness 
differed from the one that will be discussed in this Article,34 the charge alleged 
that OURWalmart was a subsidiary, affiliated organization, or agent of the 
United Food and Commercial Workers.35  Although the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) informally resolved the charge without having to reach 
the substance of the allegations,36 if the case had been actively litigated, the 
status of OURWalmart would have needed to be determined; either it was an 
agent of the union in connection with the conduct complained of, or, 
alternatively, it was a labor organization in its own right, and therefore 
independently subject to liability under the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA).37  This Article discusses the threshold question of whether ALT-labor 
groups independently possess status as labor organizations under the NLRA in 
order to determine whether they are capable of engaging in secondary boycotts.38 
                                                            
Berman ran “full-page ads attacking the Restaurant Opportunities Center,” which is “one of the 
nation’s largest worker centers . . . .”). 
 31. Indeed, the common law conceived of such protest as simple criminal conspiracy.  See 
Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 112–16 (1842) (rejecting the general view of the 
time but chronicling its prevalence in the mid-nineteenth century). 
 32. As discussed further in this Article, ALT-labor liability turns on whether a group is a 
“labor organization.”  If a group is a labor organization, it is capable of violating a variety of labor 
laws.  Therefore, the Article focuses on violations of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)’s 
secondary boycott prohibitions under sections 8(b)(4)(B) and 303 of the NLRA, as amended.  See 
also Eli Naduris-Weissman, The Worker Center Movement and Traditional Labor Law: A 
Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 232, 263–71 (2009) (providing an exhaustive 
discussion of the variety of potential violations). 
 33. Lawrence E. Dubé, Wal-Mart Bid To Block ‘Black Friday’ Action Requires Retailer To 
Prove UFCW’s Objective, BLOOMBERG LAW, http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/wal-
mart-bid-to-block-black-friday/ (last visited Aug. 26, 2014). 
 34. The Wal-Mart charge alleged that the union and its “affiliates” engaged in unlawful 
“recognitional” picketing under section 8(b)(7) of the NLRA, id., which this Article does not 
discuss. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See Advice Memorandum from the Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Case 26-CP-093377 (Apr. 
10, 2013), available at http://www.nlrb.gov/case/26-CP-093377. 
 37. The NLRA prohibits only “employers” and “labor organizations” from engaging in 
specified conduct.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (b) (2006). 
 38. A complete taxonomy of ALT-labor groups is beyond the scope of the Article.  However, 
it may be conceded that any group receiving all of its support from one or more labor unions could 
much more readily be conceived as an agent of the union or unions.  It may just as readily be 
acknowledged that groups receiving no support from unions and engaging in no protest over terms 
2014] A Labor Organization Bargain 843 
Part I of this Article discusses secondary boycotts.  Because ALT-labor 
groups cannot violate the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA unless they 
are labor organizations, Part II engages in an extended discussion of the 
surprisingly complicated question of when a “group” is considered an NLRA 
labor organization subject to the secondary boycott provisions.  In light of the 
complexity inherent in determining whether ALT-labor groups are labor 
organizations, Part III suggests that the time may be ripe for a “bipartisan” 
modification of the NLRA’s labor organization definition.  Anticipating the 
objection that no modification of labor law is likely in light of the persistence of 
legislative gridlock, this Article underscores that employers have badly wanted 
to modify the NLRA labor organization definition for two decades, and actually 
achieved a bipartisan modification in 1996, only to see the compromise vetoed 
by President Clinton.39  Finally, this Article argues that organized labor may be 
similarly amenable to compromise on a narrowing of the labor organization 
definition, particularly given ALT-labor groups’ vulnerability to liability under 
the secondary boycott provisions, organized labor’s increasing embrace of ALT-
labor, and a growing precariat40 that will not be easily organized using traditional 
labor organizing principles. 
I.  SECONDARY BOYCOTTS 
A.  Secondary Boycotts and Labor Injunctions 
Traditionally, one of the quickest ways for businesses to quash labor 
protests—besides summarily firing employee activists41—was to obtain court-
issued labor injunctions.42  However, the present generation of business leaders, 
having come of age during docile labor times43 and without a need to understand 
traditional labor law, may not realize that obtaining labor injunctions in the 
federal courts to suspend peaceful labor activity of the type presently engaged 
in by ALT-labor is typically not possible.  The Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 
                                                            
and conditions of employment are much harder to think of as a “labor advocacy” group of the kind 
that it is under discussion in the Article.  This Article focuses on groups in the murky middle that 
engage in some activity traditionally carried out by unions, but are not structured like unions, and 
do not formally claim to represent employees for purposes of collective bargaining.  Even these 
groups come in a dizzying array.  They are big and small, national and local. 
 39. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 52 (4th ed. 2004). 
 40. See The Precariat, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY, http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/ 
buzzword/entries/precariat.html (last updated Feb. 16, 2011) (defining “precariat” as “a social 
group consisting of people whose lives are difficult because they have little or no job security and 
few employment rights . . . .”). 
 41. A firing of this sort is now unlawful.  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3). 
 42. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 1 (1930). 
 43. See Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low, 
11.3%, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2013, at B1 (discussing acceleration of “the long decline in the number 
of American workers belonging to labor unions . . . .”). 
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broadly prohibits federal courts from issuing such injunctions.44  An important 
exception to this rule, however, is that injunctions against “labor organizations” 
remain available for certain conduct specifically prohibited by the NLRA.45  
Secondary boycotts are an important example of NLRA-prohibited conduct and 
they are subject to federal court injunction.46  A secondary boycott47 has 
                                                            
 44. See Act of Mar. 23, 1932, Pub. L. No. 72-65, 47 Stat. 70, 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 
101–115) (preventing federal courts from “issu[ing] any restraining order or temporary or 
permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute . . . .”).  Many states 
have in effect “little Norris-LaGuardia Acts.”  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-1808 (2003); 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-3-118 (2012); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-112 (West 2013); HAW. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 380-7 (LexisNexis 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-701 (2003); 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/1 (West 2008); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-6-1-6 (LexisNexis 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
904 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:844 (2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 25, § 5 (2007); MD. CODE 
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 4-314 (LexisNexis 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 214, § 6 (2005); MINN. 
STAT. ANN.  § 185.13 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:15-5.1 (West 2000); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 50-3-1 (2012); N.Y. LAB. LAW § 807 (McKinney 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-08-03 (2004); 
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 662.080 (West 2013); 43 PA. CONS. & STAT. ANN. § 206i (West 2009); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-10-2 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-19-2 (LexisNexis 2011); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 49.32.072 (West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 103.56 (West 2012); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 27-7-101 (2011).  This issue has broader applicability under state law, but such considerations 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 45. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (l). 
 46. Some commentators focus on the potential for ALT-labor groups to violate the 
recognitional picketing provisions of the NLRA, especially section 8(b)(7)(C).  A full discussion 
of those provisions is beyond the scope of this Article.  As a general proposition, “labor 
organizations” picketing for recognition or bargaining must comply with a precise regulatory 
framework or they risk violating the NLRA.  See generally S.F. Local Joint Exec. Bd. of Culinary 
Workers. v. NLRB, 501 F.2d 794 (1974) (demonstrating how the D.C. Circuit analyzes 
recognitional picketing cases).  However, it may be difficult to characterize ALT-labor groups as 
possessing the necessary recognition or bargaining object.  See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (stating that 
picketing or threatening to picket “any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an 
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization” is an unfair labor practice).  Protest 
activity may be protected by the NLRA’s publicity provisos or characterized as “area standards” 
picketing, which is also protected by the NLRA.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Dist. 
Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 207 n.42 (1978) (explaining that “area-standards picketing” 
was recognized as a right under the NLRA in the 1960s); Int’l Hod Carriers & Calumet Contractors 
Ass’n, 133 N.L.R.B. 512, 512–13 (1961) (stating that the NLRA does not disallow area-standards 
picketing).  From the employer’s vantage, protest activity is more reliably characterized as a 
secondary boycott.  See Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212, 222–27 
(1982) (holding that a union’s refusal to handle goods from the Soviet Union in protest of the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan violated secondary boycott provisions of NLRA).  However, if an ALT-
labor group is considered a labor organization under the NLRA, it is capable of violating the 
recognitional picketing provisions of the Act. 
 47. The term secondary boycott is not defined with precision. Indeed, there were no secondary 
boycott provisions in the first iteration of the NLRA.  However, the Taft-Hartley Act added the 
initial secondary boycott prohibition to section 8(b)(4)(A) of the NLRA in 1947.  United Food & 
Commercial Workers Local 1996 & Visiting Nurse Health Sys., Inc., 336 N.L.R.B. 421, 423–24 
(2001).  The Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959 (LGA) closed off certain loopholes to the prohibition, 
refined the secondary prohibition to its present form, and included the alterations in section 
8(b)(4)(B) of the NLRA.  Id. at 424–25.  Further, the LGA independently outlawed a specific form 
of secondary conduct in which a union and a neutral employer agree that the neutral employer will 
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traditionally been explained as some “combination to influence A by exerting      
. . . economic or social pressure against persons” with whom A deals.48 
The statutory definition of “boycott” has a specialized meaning that is 
different than the common conception of a boycott as, for example, a consumer’s 
refusing to purchase the goods of a company with which he or she has a dispute.  
A “boycott” is an organized refusal, a collective action, meant to pressure a 
neutral employer during a labor dispute in any number of ways including by 
striking, picketing, or “boycotting” the purchase of products or services.49 
Workers may naturally wish to support the causes of other workers.50  But 
American labor law has always sought to prevent general strikes, meaning 
simultaneous work stoppages of workers “in all or most industries.”51  Labor 
organizations are not permitted to expand the “front” of a labor dispute they may 
have with one employer, known as the “primary” employer, to the premises of 
a “secondary” or “neutral” employer.52  If they do, federal courts may grant 
neutral employers injunctive relief and damages in order to suppress the 
conduct.53  Two policies underlie this limitation.  The first is containing primary 
labor disputes to minimize injury to interstate commerce.  The second is the 
notion that it is not fair to allow the pressuring of a neutral employer, which has 
neither the ability nor duty to control the labor relations of the involved union 
and the primary employer. 
If the NLRB finds that a labor organization engaged in a secondary boycott, 
it is required (in the absence of very prompt settlement) to seek a temporary 
                                                            
not handle the products of a different employer with whom the union has a primary labor dispute.  
See Ets-Hokin Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 839, 844–45 (1965) (explaining that, in that case, unions 
unlawfully convinced Ets-Hokin to remove another company from a construction project). 
 48. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 42, at 43.  There are, of course, some who object 
to the whole idea of a secondary boycott on strictly moral grounds.  See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, 
Secondary Boycotts and the Breakdown of Civil Society, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 3, 2012, 8:32 
AM),.http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/03/secondary-boycotts-and-the-breakdown-ofcivilsociety/   
(claiming that “substantial risks” accompany secondary boycotts). 
 49. See 520 S. Mich. Ave. Assocs., Ltd. v. Unite Here Local 1, No. 13-1938, slip op. at 11 
(7th Cir. July 29, 2014). 
 50. See, e.g., DANIEL GROSS & STAUGHTON LYND, SOLIDARITY UNIONISM AT STARBUCKS 
22, 23 (2011) (characterizing “solidarity unionism” as a movement that passes from one worker to 
another, and explaining that when Starbucks baristas in New York City went on strike that 
“[s]olidarity [] poured in from around the world”). 
 51. General Strike, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/ 
definition/american_english/general-strike (last visited Aug. 28, 2014).  This was a central purpose 
of the Taft-Hartley reforms, Nat’l Woodwork Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.L.R.B., 386 U.S. 612, 623–24 
(1967), although it is difficult to conceive of the early American state as excessively hostile to any 
form of strike, JOSIAH BARTLETT LAMBERT, IF THE WORKERS TOOK A NOTION: THE RIGHT TO 
STRIKE AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 21–23 (2005). 
 52. See Douds v. Metro. Fed’n of Architects, Eng’rs, Chemists & Technicians Local 231, 75 
F. Supp. 672, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (explaining the nexus requirement between the “front” and the 
picketing union). 
 53. ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 691–92 (14th ed. 2006). 
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injunction in federal district court to restrain the conduct.54  If the court grants 
the injunction, there are at least two significant consequences.  First, all present 
secondary picketing must cease, and severe sanctions will attach for violations 
of the injunction.55  Second, as a practical matter, strikes or any other labor 
activity will likely be broken by an injunction.56  If federal courts embarked on 
a course of enjoining ALT-labor, the probable response of protesting 
employees—especially those without the benefit of legal counsel—would be to 
sharply curtail protest activity. 
There are two ways that the conduct of a labor organization could possibly 
violate section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.  First, it is potentially unlawful for a labor 
organization “to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed 
by any person . . . to engage in[] a strike or a refusal . . . to use, manufacture, 
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods . . . or to perform 
any services . . . .”57  Second, it is potentially unlawful for a labor organization 
“to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an 
industry affecting commerce . . . .”58  However, for the conduct to be unlawful, 
it must be coupled with a proscribed object.59  In the case of a secondary boycott, 
a violation occurs when any of the aforementioned conduct is engaged in with 
the object of “forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, 
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, 
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person . . 
. .”60 
Thus, to continue with the hypothetical presented at the beginning of this 
Article, if OURWalmart pickets at a protest organized by Fast Food Forward at 
the premises of a fast food restaurant with the object of persuading fast food 
workers to strike, or even with the object of forcing any person to cease doing 
business with any other business, then OURWalmart is in jeopardy of violating 
the NLRA’s secondary boycott provision.  OURWalmart may argue that it is 
merely protesting the fact that all workers are being paid substandard wages or 
                                                            
 54. 29 U.S.C. § 160(l) (2006). 
 55. See Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Staging an Effective Strike and the Enduring Role of 
Criminal Law in Modern Labor Relations, 11 J. LAB. & SOC’Y 23, 31–33 (2008), available at 
http://lawweb.colorado.edu/profiles/pubpdfs/white/White11WUSA.pdf-(describing-applicable 
criminal sanctions). 
 56. See JULIE GREENE, PURE AND SIMPLE POLITICS: THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 
AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM, 1881-1917 85 (1998) (noting “[m]any [] strikes . . . [are] met with defeat 
through injunctions handed down by state and federal courts . . . .”). 
 57. Id. § 158(b)(4)(i). 
 58. Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii). 
 59. Section 158(b)(4) lists four proscribed objects. This Article addresses only the “secondary 
boycott” object. 
 60. Id. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B).  Some narrow provisos to the rule exist, but most are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
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working in substandard conditions.61  But unless OURWalmart proceeds with 
great caution in communicating and investigating the basis for this “area 
standards” message—that is, a message meant only to communicate facts 
showing that a particular employer provides pay and benefits that are less than 
what is normally provided by employers in the local area62—the NLRB may 
deem the activity “secondary” and, therefore, unlawful.63 
If OURWalmart is, for example, suggesting to workers that they should not 
go to work, or is persuading customers to boycott a fast food restaurant, a serious 
“cease doing business” issue arises, for the underlying presumption of this 
strictly enforced provision is that OURWalmart is surreptitiously pressuring a 
neutral employer in the hope of indirectly improving working conditions at Wal-
Mart.64  Moreover, the NLRB need only find that an object of OURWalmart is 
to cause some person to cease doing business with any other person in order to 
establish a violation of the NLRA.65  Additionally, in some instances a “cease 
doing business” object simply may be inferred.  For example, in International 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied International, Inc.,66 the Supreme Court stated, 
“[w]hen a purely secondary boycott ‘reasonably can be expected to threaten 
neutral parties with ruin or substantial loss’ . . . the pressure on secondary parties 
must be viewed as at least one of the objects of the boycott or the statutory 
prohibition would be rendered meaningless.”67  In other words, if the secondary 
                                                            
 61. It might be argued that because OURWalmart would merely be present at what was in 
effect the lawful primary protest of Fast Food Forward, OURWalmart’s activity would not really 
be secondary because it would not be trying to affect its own labor conditions through coercion of 
a neutral employer.  Rather, OURWalmart would be attempting to impact the labor conditions of 
other employers through “solidarity picketing.”  Of course, it would all depend on what 
OURWalmart was doing or saying.  However, to the extent the group was engaged in secondary 
conduct, and had a secondary object, the fact that Fast Food Forward was simultaneously engaging 
in primary labor protest would not insulate OURWalmart from liability.  See NLRB v. Omaha 
Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 856 F.2d 47, 50–51 (8th Cir. 1988). 
 62. Under the publicity proviso, a peaceful area standards campaign that uses handbilling or 
bannering, truthfully advises the public of a labor dispute, that does not have a proscribed secondary 
object or conduct element such as picketing or disruptive or otherwise coercive non-picketing 
conduct, implicates First Amendment concerns and does not violate section 158(b)(4).  See Circle 
Grp., L.L.C. v. Se. Carpenters Reg’l Council, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1327, 1356 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (citing 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 583–
84 (1988)). 
 63. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n Local 7 & Andy J. Eagn Co., 345 N.L.R.B. 1322, 1331 
(2005) (“When area standards picketing is involved, the burden is on the union to [] make 
reasonable inquiry to determine whether . . . the picketed employer is meeting area standards, 
wages, and benefits.  Otherwise, the purported purpose of area standards picketing may be deemed 
pretextual, and evidence of improper motive found.”). 
 64. See Richard A. Bock, Secondary Boycotts: Understanding NLRB Interpretation of Section 
8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 905, 908 (2005) 
(describing the structure of a secondary boycott). 
 65. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 688–89 (1951). 
 66. 456 U.S. 212 (1982). 
 67. Id. at 224. 
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activity of OURWalmart resulted in “substantial loss”68 to the “neutral” fast food 
restaurant, an unlawful secondary object would likely be presumed.69 
It must be emphasized that employees may express solidarity for one 
another’s causes.  Thus, the mere presence of ALT-labor group A at a protest 
function of ALT-labor group B—including, for example, a joint presence at a 
coordinated ALT-labor rally—does not in itself convert protest to secondary 
boycott activity.  Members of ALT-labor group A may be present and may 
protest the employment policies of the employer of group B.  What ALT-labor 
group A cannot lawfully do is strike, or “threaten” or “coerce” anyone to “cease 
doing business” with the employer of ALT-labor group B to effectuate changes 
to that employer’s employment policies.  For, with respect to employer B, ALT-
labor group A has no primary labor dispute.70 
B.  Secondary Boycotts and Civil Damages 
In addition to the risk of injunction, the NLRA provides employers with a 
private right of action for compensatory damages arising from secondary activity 
                                                            
 68. In an earlier case, NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen Local 760, 377 
U.S. 58, 72 (1964), the Supreme Court held that certain unions did not violate the NLRA when they 
limited secondary picketing of retail stores to asking customers not to buy the products of firms 
against which one of the unions was striking.  The Court found that consumer picketing of the 
neutral retailer was permissible unless the picketing was “employed to persuade customers not to 
trade at all with the secondary employer . . . .”  Id. at 72.  However, the Court later altered that rule 
by holding that “[p]roduct picketing that reasonably can be expected to threaten neutral parties with 
ruin or substantial loss simply does not square with the language of the purpose of [NLRA] § 
8(b)(4)(ii)(B).”  NLRB v. Retail Store Emps. Union Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 614–15 (1980). 
 69. This interpretation reads the “object” requirement out of the statute entirely.  The 
conclusion begs the question: are the injured employers truly neutral because the court failed to 
identify any object on the part of the union to do injury to them?  The conclusion is actually the 
fruition of early developments in cases that focused on injuries to neutrals in the context of limited 
“object evidence.”  See, e.g., NLRB v. Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity, 407 
F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting that although the statute requires a “cease doing business” 
object, an objective to cause “serious disruption of an existing business relationship” is sufficient 
to satisfy the statutory requirement).  The union in International Longshoremen’s Ass’n argued 
there was not a “primary” at all, that the primary-neutral distinction was completely collapsed, and 
that reference to statutory “neutrals” was a legal fiction.  Brief for Petitioner at 28–29, Int’l 
Longshoremen’s Ass’n, v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (1982) (No. 80-1663).  Whereas in mixed 
object scenarios a court will find a labor organization engaged in unlawful secondary activity when 
only one of its objects is proscribed by the NLRA, Denver Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 341 
U.S. at 689, the courts have relaxed even that forgiving standard by whittling away its predicate to 
a skeletal core which requires only the possibility that the fruit of an unlawful object—even an 
unintended one—be foreseen. 
 70. See NLRB v. Ironworkers Local 433, 833 F.2d 1024, 1024 (9th Cir. 1989) (“To determine 
whether concerted activity is primary or secondary, it is necessary to ascertain whether ‘the object 
of [the activity] is to affect the labor policies of th[e] primary employer’ or whether the activity is 
‘engaged in for its effect elsewhere.’”).  Thus, a violation could arise if, in addition to the presence 
of ALT-labor group A at employer B’s premises, group A encourages work stoppages, employer 
boycotts, or engages in any similar conduct with a “cease doing business” object. 
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that is found to violate section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.71  The availability of court-
awarded civil damages for section 8(b)(4) violations is an anomaly of the 
American labor law system in which administrative agencies adjudicate most 
claims and compensatory damages are unavailable.72  The NLRA also provides 
that anyone injured in business or property by a secondary boycott possesses a 
private right of action for damages.73  The provision renders any “labor 
organization” in violation of the secondary boycott prohibition of section 
8(b)(4)(B) broadly liable for damages and the cost of any suit resulting from the 
violation.74  Employers may recover business losses caused by a labor 
organization’s peaceful but unlawful secondary activities.75  Further, the NLRA 
may arguably act as a kind of protection to ALT-labor because it preempts state 
law actions for damages premised on a peaceful secondary boycott theory.76  
Nevertheless, the NLRA exposes ALT-labor groups to civil liability for damage 
to business relationships, loss of business profits, idled equipment, and 
additional personnel required to operate a business during the period of an illegal 
work stoppage.77 
Interestingly, to the extent that an ALT-labor group is found to be an agent of 
a union rather than a labor organization in its own right, there is developing 
authority that it would not be liable under the NLRA.78  To consider how this 
provision might operate, modify some facts of the earlier ALT-labor 
hypothetical.  This time, imagine that Fast Food Forward members appear at a 
local Wal-Mart in support of an OURWalmart protest.  Imagine further that the 
protest is extremely successful and that many customers decline to cross the 
ALT-labor picket lines.  If a federal district court concluded that a “labor 
organization” had “threaten[ed], coerce[ed], or restrain[ed] any person engaged 
in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce”79 with the object of “forcing 
or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or 
                                                            
 71. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union Local 20 v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 258 (1964). 
 72. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (2006) (allowing the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) to 
provide temporary relief it finds “just and proper”). 
 73. See 29 U.S.C. § 187(b) (indicating that anyone injured by unfair labor practices may 
“recover the damages by him sustained and the cost of the suit”). 
 74. See id. 
 75. See Morton, 377 U.S. at 260 (holding that, although the petitioner’s protest was peaceful, 
the lower court’s award to petitioner “cannot stand” because of petitioner’s secondary boycott 
behavior). 
 76. See, e.g., Labor-Ready Mid-Atlantic, Inc. v. Tri-State Building & Construction Trades 
Council Local 667, No. 2:99-0037, 2001 WL 1358708, at *1 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 21, 2001) (holding 
that the NLRB may assert jurisdiction over claims advanced under state law if the behavior that 
forms the basis of those claims is “unlawful secondary activity”). 
 77. However, punitive damages are unavailable.  See COX, supra note 53, at 771. 
 78. See, e.g., Jung Sun Laundry Group Corp. v. Laundry, Dry Cleaning, & Allied Workers 
Joint Bd., No. 10 Civ. 468 (RMB)(JLC), 2010 WL 4457135, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2010) 
(citing Wild Edibles Inc. v. Indus. Workers of World Local 460/640, No. 07 Civ. 9225(LLS), 2008 
WL 4548392, at *1, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2008)). 
 79. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
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otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or 
manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person[,]”80 the ALT-
labor group could be liable for the loss of business occasioned by the action.  It 
might also be liable for other compensatory costs involving items such as 
personnel modifications, inventory control, and enhanced on site security.81  
Clearly, these costs could escalate and be very difficult to bear by an ALT-labor 
group. 
II.  LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 
A.  Introductory Remarks on the Labor Organization Question 
Secondary boycott prohibitions apply only to labor organizations.82  Thus, if 
ALT-labor groups are not labor organizations, they are not bound by the 
NLRA’s secondary boycott provisions and the groups’ peaceful labor protest 
activities are likely immune from federal court injunctions.83  Employers and 
their allies avoid the question of whether ALT-labor groups qualify as labor 
organizations by arguing that unions are behind ALT-labor and, therefore, ALT-
labor should be bound to the same rules that bind labor unions.84  The role of 
unions in encouraging ALT-labor is becoming well known,85 and the AFL-CIO 
openly acknowledges and embraces the connection between unions and ALT-
labor groups.86  Tellingly, the AFL-CIO underscores that its increasingly 
formalizing relationship with worker centers began in 2006,87 the year in which 
                                                            
 80. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 81. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 82. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006) (defining practices that constitute “unfair labor practice[s]” 
when performed by “a labor organization or its agents . . . .”). 
 83. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emps., 481 U.S. 429, 451 (1987) 
(holding that, in the absence of specific Congressional authorization to the contrary, federal courts 
may not issue labor injunctions in peaceful labor disputes). 
 84. See, e.g., Stefan J. Marculewicz & Jennifer Thomas, Labor & Employment Law: Labor 
Organizations by Another Name: The Worker Center Movement and its Evolution into Coverage 
Under the NLRA and LMRDA, ENGAGE, Oct. 2012, at 79, 79 (characterizing ALT-labor worker 
centers as “no different[] than the traditional labor organization”). 
 85. See, e.g., Richard Berman, Worker Centers: A Backdoor for Unions, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2013/10/14/worker-
centers-are-just-a-backdoor-for-unions (exemplifying the actions of the Center for Union Facts to 
advance knowledge about worker centers). 
 86. See Worker Center Partnerships, AFL-CIO, http://www.aflcio.org/About/Worker-
Center-Partnerships (last visited Aug. 29, 2014) (acknowledging that “the AFL-CIO has formed 
partnerships with worker centers and other groups of working people who do not have the legal 
right to collective bargaining”).  Further, the strengthening ties between organized labor and ALT-
labor was a primary topic of discussion at a 2013 AFL-CIO convention.  See Mark Vorpahl, At 
AFL-CIO Convention, Leaders Ask: What Direction for Labor?, TRUTHOUT (Sept. 11, 2013, 4:55 
PM),-http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/18769-at-afl-cio-convention-leaders-ask-what -               
direction-for-labor (noting that ALT-labor groups were “highlighted at the convention”). 
 87. Id. 
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the massive “Day Without Immigrants” rallies transpired.88  Unions consistently 
provide expertise and counsel to ALT-labor.89  Still, by historical labor 
movement standards, the involvement of unions in ALT-labor is complex and 
vague.  Community groups, worker centers, and other non-union advocacy 
groups often lead the tactics, and almost always the financing, of ALT-labor 
protests.90  This does not mean, of course, that ALT-labor is not receiving 
considerable assistance from unions.91  But there is substantial evidence that 
many “activist charitable foundations”92 have been heavily funding ALT-labor, 
particularly worker centers.93  The Department of Labor has also directly funded 
worker centers.94 
All of this complexity makes it difficult to agree with the simplistic 
formulation that “unions are behind” worker centers or other ALT-labor groups.  
Such funding, moreover, implicates broader civil society protest and nudges the 
context of ALT-labor slightly away from traditional, unmixed labor activism.  
For example, it is easier to conceive of an ALT-labor group funded by the Ford 
Foundation as a social activist group than it is to see a group funded and directed 
exclusively by the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union 
as a social activist group. 
The inchoate, elusive involvement of unions in ALT-labor—as opposed to 
their direct, traditional involvement—has multiple explanations.  The 
notoriously high employee turnover rate of low-wage workers95 makes them 
especially hard for unions to organize using traditional methods.96  Workers 
                                                            
 88. See Teresa Watanabe & Joe Mathews, Unions Helped to Organize ‘Day Without 
Immigrants’, L.A. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at B1. 
 89. See, e.g., id. (mentioning that organized labor was instrumental in making the “Day 
Without Immigrants” march successful).  See also Bacon, supra note 16 (acknowledging that the 
Service Employees International Union helped coordinate protests in December 2013). 
 90. See Jarol B. Manheim, The Emerging Role of Worker Centers in Union Organizing: A 
Strategic Assessment 9–16 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Working Paper, 2013), available at 
http://www.workforcefreedom.com/sites/default/files/WFI%20Manheim%20Study%2011-21-
2013.pdf. 
 91. The Service Employees International Union, for example, has ramped up financial 
support to the fast food ALT-labor groups reportedly contributing $15 million since January 2013.  
Bruce Horovitz et al., Fast Food Workers Rally for Higher Wages, PNJ.COM (May 15, 2014), 
http://archive.pnj.com/usatoday/article/9114245. 
 92. See id. at 13 (exemplifying the U.S. Chamber of Commerce’s use of this phrase). 
 93. Id.  Charitable organizations, including notable groups like the Ben & Jerry’s Foundation, 
the Marguerite Foundation, the Ford Foundation, and the Kresge Foundation, contribute to the 
worker center movement.  Id. at 15–20. 
 94. Id. at 21. 
 95. Arindrajit Dube, T. William Lester & Michael Reich, Minimum Wage Shocks, 
Employment Flows and Labor Market Frictions 17 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, 
Working Paper No. 149-13, 2013), available at http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/149-
13.pdf. 
 96. See Molly Korab, Can Fast-Food Workers Raise Wages With One-Day Strikes?, NEW 
REPUBLIC (Aug. 2, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/114147/fast-food-workers-one-
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often voluntarily depart from a low-wage workplace before they can be 
organized.97  Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,98 unauthorized workers fired during traditional union 
organizing campaigns are not entitled to remedies under the NLRA,99 which 
makes immigrant workers understandably reluctant to support a union openly.100  
Given the difficult legal terrain for organizing, unions may be reluctant to devote 
significant resources to organizing low-wage workers.  However, they may be 
willing to render some lesser level of assistance, especially where outside 
charitable organizations are contributing to the cause. 
Unions may also be better able to face workers in unsuccessful campaigns 
outside of the traditional labor organizing drive.  Low-wage workers seem to 
understand that the possibility of failure in nontraditional drives is high and that 
they are involved in a Sisyphean struggle in which they “‘have nothing to 
lose.’”101  The probability of success may be understood from the beginning as 
low, and the union seems less likely to be blamed if it fails. 
Sinister explanations abound when there is any union involvement in ALT-
labor.  Commentators assert that unions are using worker centers to insulate 
themselves from labor law liability.102  Under the NLRA, unions, as 
acknowledged labor organizations, are proscribed from engaging in certain 
conduct.103  Commentators allege that unions evade such proscriptions by acting 
through ALT-labor.104  This curious argument assumes that unions would 
deliberately expose potential future members to surrogate legal liability.105  Less 
                                                            
day-strike-and-future-labor-organizing (“[O]ld labor laws rely on a sense of permanency that isn’t 
as prevalent today.”). 
 97. See id. 
 98. 535 U.S. 137 (2002). 
 99. See id. at 151–52 (holding that the NLRB’s jurisdiction is not broad enough to permit it 
to grant awards to unauthorized workers). 
 100. See Ruben J. Garcia, Ten Years After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: The 
Power of a Labor Law Symbol, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 659, 669 (2012) (indicating that 
undocumented workers may be unwilling to stand up for their rights). 
 101. Steven Greenhouse, A Day’s Strike Seeks to Raise Fast-Food Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 
2013, at A1 (quoting Columbia Professor of Political Science Dorian T. Warren). 
 102. See Kris Maher, Nonunion Worker Advocacy Groups Under Scrutiny, WALL ST. J., July 
24,-2013,-http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887429712045786283846775530 
(suggesting that unions are blurring the lines between what is an organized union and what is a 
working center for the purpose of escaping financial filing requirements). 
 103. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2006). 
 104. Berman, supra note 85 (“[Worker centers’] legal status allows them to dodge all of the 
financial transparency, governance and organizational regulations established by federal law.  
There are no officer elections, no annual financial filings with the federal government and no 
guarantees that they’re acting on behalf of the employees they claim to represent.”).  See also 
Marculewicz & Thomas, supra note 84 (claiming that ALT-labor groups “avoid the legal duty of 
accountability to the workers they represent” that is characteristic of unions). 
 105. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce grapples with explaining this motivation as follows: 
In the purest sense, [worker centers clearly functioning as mere surrogates for unions] 
may not be [] worker center[s] at all, but merely another in a series of secondary 
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curious is the argument that unions, in acting through ALT-labor, are simply 
avoiding a purportedly tainted union “brand.”106  According to this argument, 
the cause of unaffiliated low-wage restaurant workers is more sympathetic than 
that of union organizers or supporters. 
Whether ALT-labor groups are de facto agents of unions is of questionable 
legal significance.  A union may lawfully organize employees and employees 
may lawfully assist unions. Indeed, the organization and representation of 
employees by unions are the most basic protected activities under the NLRA.107  
Whether unions provide to employees or receive from employees organizing 
assistance directly or through intermediaries appears to be immaterial.  
Employees independently possess NLRA rights to engage in “concerted 
activities” under the NLRA.108  They may choose to exercise these rights with 
the guidance and technical direction of an organization.  Union assistance of 
employees to exercise rights through ALT-labor is the same as any actor helping 
workers to obtain rights they already possess under the NLRA.  “Labor 
organizations,” however, are regulated under both the NLRA and the Labor-
Management Relations Disclosure Act (LMRDA), and are required to operate 
by certain rules, regardless of the rights possessed by employees.109  Ultimately, 
questions of agency only have legal significance when there is a violation of the 
rules.  The more difficult question is whether ALT-labor groups are capable of 
violating these rules in their own right and not as the agents of unions.110 
B.  The Labor Organization Analysis 
The question, therefore, is whether ALT-labor groups are “labor 
organizations.”  Under the NLRA, the term “labor organization” is defined as 
“any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation 
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the 
                                                            
mechanisms for building alliance structures or appealing for public approbation while 
obscuring somewhat the union label, presumably because the union strategists find such 
limiting of transparency advantageous for some reason. 
Manheim, supra note 90, at 35 (emphasis added).  A less-tortured argument is that employee 
participation in alternative forms of employee representation could help individuals develop 
“political skills and voice functions” that may serve as a precursor to unionization.  See Michael H. 
LeRoy, Employee Participation in the New Millennium: Redefining a Labor Organization Under 
Section 8(a)(2) Of The NLRA, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1651, 1703 (1999). 
 106. See Manheim, supra note 90, at 35 (claiming that unions need ALT-labor groups to reach 
new classes of workers). 
 107. 29 U.S.C. § 157. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(b), 412, 439, 440. 
 110. For example, in response to the ALT-labor activities leading up to and planned for Black 
Friday 2012, Wal-Mart filed charges against the United Food and Commercial Workers Union 
although the activities in question involved the ALT-labor group OURWalmart, apparently because 
Wal-Mart was unsure of the legal status of OURWalmart.  See Tony Lee, Walmart Files Charges 
Against UFCW Union, BREITBART (Nov. 18, 2012), http://www.breitbart.com/Big-
Government/2012/11/17/Wal-Mart-Files-Charges-Against-UFCW-Union. 
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purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, 
labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of 
work.”111  ALT-labor groups are surely “organizations of any kind,” given that 
they, in part, attempt to address employee grievances, advancing the cause of 
employees in labor disputes, and improving employee wages, rates of pay, hours 
of employment, or conditions of work in some manner.112 
It may not always be as clear, however, that ALT-labor groups have the 
purpose of addressing these statutorily enumerated work-related issues by 
“dealing with” employers.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines “purpose” as “[a]n 
objective, goal, or end.”113  Regrettably, the NLRA does not define purpose.  
Therefore, one is led into the traditional morass of determining whether an 
“objective, goal, or end” has been happily and explicitly stated or, more 
problematically, must be inferred from surrounding conduct. 
1.  Express Versus Inferred “Dealing With” Purpose 
Given that ALT-labor organizations’ charters sometimes define the purpose 
of the groups as “dealing with” employers,114 the groups could not easily argue 
that they did not possess such a purpose.  However, explicit acknowledgement 
of a “dealing with” purpose is not required under the NLRA to establish that a 
group falls within the definition of a labor organization.  In NLRB v. Cabot 
Carbon Co.,115 the Supreme Court established that the purpose of a putative 
labor organization may be discovered not only by reference to the organization’s 
stated purpose, but also by determining what the organization does in reality.116 
                                                            
 111. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5). 
 112. See, e.g., About Us, supra note 7 (providing the homepage of OURWalmart, and 
describing how the group communicates its mission to Wal-Mart management).  The group asks 
Wal-Mart to listen to its associates, have respect for the individual, recognize freedoms of 
association and speech, fix its Open Door policy, pay a minimum of thirteen dollars per hour and 
make full-time jobs available for associates who want them, create dependable and predictable 
work schedules, provide affordable healthcare, provide every associate with a policy manual, 
ensure equal enforcement of policy and anti-discrimination rules, provide every associate equal 
opportunity to succeed and advance in his or her career, and offer wages and benefits that ensure 
that no associate has to rely on government assistance.  Sign the Declaration, OURWALMART, 
http://forrespect.org/sign-the-declaration/ (last visited Aug. 29, 2014). 
 113. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1356 (9th ed. 2009). 
 114. See, e.g., Thompson Ramo Woolridge, Inc. & Gen. Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers 
Local Union No. 298, 132 N.L.R.B. 993, 994 (1961), enforced, 305 F.2d 807 (7th Cir. 1962) (“The 
best evidence of the purpose of the Association may be found in its charter and bylaws.”). 
 115. 360 U.S. 203 (1959). 
 116. Id. at 213.  The NLRB has underscored this point.  In Electromation, Inc. & International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049, 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 996 (1992), a case in which 
non-union employee committees were found to be labor organizations under the NLRA, the NLRB 
stated that “[p]urpose is a matter of what the organization is set up to do, and that may be shown 
by what the organization actually does.”  See also Keeler Brass Auto. Grp. & Puckett, 317 N.L.R.B. 
1110, 1113 (1995) (citing id.). 
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In Cabot Carbon Co., multiple affiliated employers established and supported 
“employee committees” in several plants.117  The committees’ explicit purpose 
was to meet regularly with management to consider and discuss problems of 
mutual interest, including grievances and handling of “grievances at nonunion 
plants and departments . . . .”118  In addition to this explicit purpose, it was also 
obvious that the established committees made many types of work-related 
proposals that were actively considered by management.119  Thus, the Court 
observed, “[c]onsideration of the declared purposes and actual functions of these 
[c]ommittees shows that they existed for the purpose, in part at least, ‘of dealing 
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours 
of employment, or conditions of work.’”120  Similarly, it is possible to argue that 
ALT-labor groups satisfy the “purpose” element when their actual functions 
demonstrate that they exist—at least partially—for the purpose of dealing with 
employers, even where their foundational charters or mission statements express 
no such purpose. 
It may be necessary, therefore, to consider whether ALT-labor groups’ actual 
activities reveal their “dealing with” purpose when no such purpose is explicitly 
stated. That consideration may allow the NLRB, or a court, to construct the 
purpose element.  However, on occasion, the NLRB argues that a group is not a 
labor organization because there is insufficient evidence to formulate a “dealing 
with” purpose from the functions and activities of the group, even if the group 
has explicitly declared a “dealing with” purpose.121  This overemphasis on 
inferred purpose can be a distraction when explicit evidence of purpose exists, 
and thus, no reason exists for inferring a purpose.122  For example, the Restaurant 
Opportunities Center of New York (ROC-NY) at one time behaved like a 
statutory labor organization in that it routinely negotiated with employers on 
behalf of employees.123  The NLRB’s Division of Advice found that it was not 
                                                            
 117. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 205–06. 
 118. Id. at 206. 
 119. Id. at 207 (finding the committees “made and discussed proposals and requests respecting 
many other aspects of the employee relationship, including seniority, job classifications, job 
bidding, makeup time, overtime records, time cards, a merit system, wage corrections, working 
schedules, holidays, vacations, sick leave, and improvement of working facilities and conditions[,]” 
and that “Respondents’ plant officials participated in those discussions and in some instances 
granted the [c]ommittees’ requests”). 
 120. Id. at 213 (first emphasis added). 
 121. See, e.g., Advice Memorandum from the Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., Cases 2-CP-1073 & 
2-CB-20787 (Nov. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1073 & 2-CB-20787] 
(demonstrating that the NLRB will disregard an entity’s defined purpose when the entity’s activities 
deviate from that purpose). 
 122. See Duff, supra note 17, at 134–36. 
 123. See Duff, supra note 17, at 135.  See also Hyde, supra note 3, at 392–94.  ROC-NY has 
recently tempered its claims that it bargains on behalf of employees.  However, ROC-NY still 
supports a “restaurant industry roundtable,” described by the group as “a collaboration of restaurant 
owners, workers, government agencies, city officials, and ROC-NY.”  The New York City 
Restaurant Industry Roundtable, ROC-NY, http://rocny.org/high-road-organizing/nycrir/ (last 
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a labor organization, however, because “ROC-NY’s conduct has not been shown 
to constitute a pattern or practice of dealing over time.  Rather, ROC-NY’s 
attempts to negotiate settlement agreements with the [e]mployers here were 
discrete, non-recurring transactions with each [e]mployer.”124  One issue with 
this statement is that the Supreme Court was clear in Cabot Carbon Co. that a 
group need not be collectively bargaining to achieve labor organization status,125 
and a “pattern and practice of dealing over time” is reminiscent of collective 
bargaining.  Even more problematically, whatever an ALT-labor group may be 
doing functionally is not of greater significance than an explicit avowal of a 
“dealing with” purpose.126  Thus, assessing groups’ actions as evidence of 
purpose should not be controlling. 
In the context of broadly inferring a “dealing with” purpose, the NLRB has 
determined that minimal contacts between a labor “group” and an employer are 
usually insufficient to establish that the group is a labor organization.127  The 
confusion lies in attempting to determine primarily whether any bilateral activity 
between a group and an employer must be demonstrated to show that a group is 
a statutory labor organization; and, secondarily, what the nature of that bilateral 
activity must be.  For example, recent NLRB authority holds that some “bilateral 
mechanism” between a putative labor organization and “target” employer must 
be established before the agency will find that labor organization status exists.128  
                                                            
visited Aug. 29, 2014).  The group encourages all New York City restaurants to join the roundtable 
and “develop strategies that help restaurants take the ‘high road’ to profitability.”  Id. 
 124. Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1073 & 2-CB-20787, supra note 121. 
 125. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. at 211–12 (“It is therefore quite clear that Congress, by 
adopting the broad term ‘dealing’ and rejecting the more limited term ‘bargaining collectively,’ did 
not intend that the broad term ‘dealing with’ should be limited to and mean only ‘bargaining with’ 
as held by the Court of Appeals.”).  One scholar believes that: 
worker centers like the Workplace Project, and worker groups like ROC-NY, are quite 
likely to be statutory labor organizations. They do indeed raise grievances with particular 
employers on behalf of particular employees. Even if this is not collective bargaining, it 
is similar to activity that has been held to constitute the activity of dealing with 
employers. Moreover, it is hard to come up with any compelling policy reason why such 
groups should be exempt from disclosure requirements, or restrictions such as the thirty-
day limit on organizational picketing that bind more traditional unions. 
Hyde, supra note 3, at 408. 
 126. For example, ROC-NY previously claimed that, as of 2007, it had engaged in six 
campaigns against employers for back wages and discrimination claims for food service workers, 
negotiated a settlement for workers from a Brooklyn deli, and negotiated a settlement with a 
restaurant involving “compensation for discrimination, paid vacations, promotions, the firing of an 
abusive waiter, and a posting in the restaurant guaranteeing workers the right to organize and the 
involvement of ROC-NY in the case of any future discrimination.”  Duff, supra note 17, at 135.  
The group also previously advertised to employees: “If you are a restaurant worker who has 
problems with your employer, call us or come by ROC-NY!”  Id.  That message was an explicit 
admission that ROC-NY existed for the purpose in whole or in part of dealing with employers. 
 127. Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1073 & 2-CB-20787, supra note 121. 
 128. See, e.g., Syracuse Univ. & Teamsters Local 317, 350 N.L.R.B. 755, 757–58 (2007); E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co. & Chem. Workers Ass’n, 311 N.L.R.B. 893, 894–95 (1993); 
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The bilateral mechanism must involve exchanges of proposals on NLRA-
defined subjects between a labor organization and management.129  However, 
the NLRB has stated that “if there are only isolated instances in which the group 
makes ad hoc proposals to management followed by a management response of 
acceptance or rejection by word or deed, the element of dealing is missing.”130 
This attempted line drawing between a bilateral proposal “pattern and practice 
mechanism” and statutory “bargaining” is unclear and confusing.  Why is it that 
a statutory labor organization may be found without “bargaining,” but that a 
“pattern and practice of exchanging proposals over time” implies that a group is 
a labor organization?  There is little indication that the NLRB intends to clarify 
the distinction.  However, the confusion is not solely attributable to NLRB 
decisions.  Rather, there is little difference between collective bargaining and 
“dealing with” in the applicable statutory scheme.  While collective bargaining 
is usually the negotiation of a comprehensive collective bargaining 
agreement,131 bilateral discussions—even over time—may have narrower 
objectives.  The problem, however, is that the NLRA’s definition of “bargaining 
in good faith” is so broad that it begins to merge imperceptibly with the NLRB’s 
“pattern and practice” invention.  The NLRA makes it in an unfair labor practice 
for an employer or a labor organization to refuse to bargain in good faith over 
terms and conditions of employment, and: 
requires the parties to “meet at reasonable times and confer in good 
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment, or the negotiation of an agreement.”  This requirement 
has been interpreted as establishing a general duty between an 
employer and its employees’ bargaining representative “to enter into 
discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere purpose to find a 
basis of agreement.”132 
Logically, under Cabot Carbon Co., the NLRB or a court might find that a 
group is a labor organization even if it does not engage in statutory bargaining 
as defined above and merely openly expresses the purpose of “dealing with” 
employers.  Equally logically, under the NLRB’s formulation, a group will not 
be found a labor organization unless its relationship with an employer amounts 
to a “bilateral mechanism of pattern and practice over time.”133  The NLRB’s 
pattern and practice interpretation has thus far inured to ALT-labor’s benefit in 
that it has allowed certain groups to escape “labor organization” status because 
they do not have the necessary durable relationship with any particular 
                                                            
Electromation, Inc. & Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049, 309 N.L.R.B. 990, 995 n.21 
(1992), enforced, 35 F.3d 1148 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 129. Electromation, Inc., 309 N.L.R.B. at 995 n.21. 
 130. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 311 N.L.R.B. at 894. 
 131. See, e.g., NLRB v. Cabot Carbon Co., 360 U.S. 203, 213 (1959). 
 132. Bryant & Stratton Bus. Inst., Inc. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 169, 182 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 133. Advice Memorandum, Cases 2-CP-1073 & 2-CB-20787, supra note 121. 
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employer.134  As a practical matter, a finding of “no labor organization status” 
implies no liability for ALT-labor groups under any NLRA prohibitions 
applicable to labor organizations. 
However, it is often risky to rely on the NLRB’s statutory interpretations 
given the reality of hostile appellate review.135  The tension between the 
Supreme Court’s discussion and potentially static definition of labor 
organization status and the NLRB’s discussion and more functional definition 
of the same is palpable.  So long as the NLRB is acting as the prosecutor in 
deciding, for example, whether an ALT-labor group has a “dealing with” 
purpose rendering it liable for NLRA violations, it may have discretion whether 
to issue an administrative complaint.136  With the exception of the Fourth 
Circuit’s opinion in Waugh Chapel South, LLC v. United Food & Commercial 
Workers Union Local 27,137 there is little authority on the question of what labor 
organization definition or analysis federal courts will apply, and that is where 
real trouble may lurk for ALT-labor.  District court judges may be more inclined 
to apply Cabot Carbon Co.’s potentially more static formulation.  The NLRB’s 
dynamic “pattern and practice over time” formulation, although accepted by the 
Fourth Circuit, cannot comfortably be regarded as a majority judicial approach 
to the labor organization question. 
One suspects Cabot Carbon Co.’s discussion of “pattern and practice” issues 
throughout the opinion,138 a discussion which was arguably obiter dictum, had 
the possibly unintended consequence of underemphasizing that the case most 
strongly turned on its finding of an express purpose.  To see how this thinking 
can go awry, imagine a workplace “committee” in which employees clearly 
participate and which clearly states in its charter that it exists for the purpose of 
bargaining with the employer in that workplace regarding wages.  The statute 
says nothing about the additional requirement that it actually deal with the 
employer regarding wages.  Cabot Carbon Co. does not so hold.  Rather, it 
permits a fact finder to evaluate what the group does as part of the overall 
                                                            
 134. Id. 
 135. See Ellen Dannin, Hoffman Plastics as Labor Law—Equality at Last for Immigrant 
Workers?, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 393, 394–95 (2009) (explaining that the written labor “law as it is 
applied today[] is the result of decades of ‘judicial amendments.’”). 
 136. See NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union, Local 23, 484 U.S. 112, 124 
(1987) (differentiating between the powers of the NLRB and those of the NLRB General Counsel); 
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985) (concluding that an agency’s decision not to enforce 
is unreviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act and the common law of judicial review).  
However, when a statute contains provisions requiring enforcement action in specified 
circumstances, a court has meaningful standards to apply concerning a non-enforcement decision 
and is authorized to undertake judicial review.  Heckler, 470 U.S at 833–34. 
 137. 728 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2013). 
 138. Cabot Carbon Co. did not utilize the “pattern and practice” phraseology explicitly.  
Rather, the case used an analysis functionally equivalent to the NLRB’s later-developed pattern 
and practice analysis.  In other words, Cabot Carbon Co. was effectively the progenitor of the 
analysis. 
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analysis.  It strains credulity to claim that a group does not exist for the reason 
stated in its founding documents. 
The NLRB itself has acknowledged in several cases that it is unnecessary to 
infer a “dealing with” purpose from “pattern and practice” when it can otherwise 
be determined;139 it simply does not apply the principle consistently.  In 
Coinmach Laundry Corp. & Local 729, Coalition of Democratic Employees,140 
a representation case, the NLRB upheld without discussion a regional director’s 
determination that a group started by three employees, and consisting of 
approximately fifty employees, was a labor organization, although it had 
unsigned by-laws, never took minutes, was not recognized by any employer or 
certified by the NLRB, did not negotiate any contracts, did not collect dues from 
employees, had no income, assets, or paid staff, and operated out of one 
employee’s house.141  One employee testified that, “the Petitioner was created 
to ‘organize, negotiate contracts regarding wages, working conditions, hours of 
employment . . . [and] grievance procedures.’”142  That was enough for the 
regional director to conclude that the organization in question was a labor 
organization within the meaning of the NLRA,143 and the NLRB affirmed the 
static determination.144 
In support of the decision, the regional director cited a number of cases in 
which the NLRB found that groups were statutory labor organizations in 
circumstances where there was no evidence of “pattern or practice” or of the 
existence of a bilateral mechanism.145  Each of the cases involved very early 
organizational efforts and was either a representation case or involved unfair 
labor practices in nascent organizing drives. 
This is logical.  At the inception of an organizing drive, there can be no 
bilateral mechanism or pattern of bargaining with an employer, and in the case 
of unaffiliated labor organizations, of the kind apparently at issue in Coinmach, 
there is likely no practice of dealing with any employer.  NLRB decisions 
suggest that the NLRB is more willing to look exclusively at express purpose 
and ignore “pattern and practice” in representational or early organizational 
cases.  The problem is that the decisions establish a principle that the barest 
                                                            
 139. See, e.g., Coinmach Laundry Corp. & Local 729, Coal. of Democratic Emps., 337 
N.L.R.B. 1286, 1286 (2002). 
 140. 337 NLRB 1286 (2002). 
 141. Id. at 1286–87. 
 142. Id. at 1287. 
 143. See id. 
 144. Id. at 1286. 
 145. Id. (citing Yale New Haven Hosp. & Yale New Haven Hosp. Police Benevolent Ass’n, 
309 N.L.R.B. 363, 363 (1992); Betances Health Unit, Inc. & Betances Health Unit Staff Ass’n, 283 
N.L.R.B. 369, 375 (1987); Comet Rice Mills Div. Early Cal. Indus. Inc. & United Rice Workers of 
Stuggart, 195 N.L.R.B. 671, 674 (1972); E. Dayton Tool & Die Co. & E. Dayton & Hawker Tool 
Emps.’ Indep. Union of Dayton, Ohio, 194 N.L.R.B. 266, 266 (1971); Butler Mfg. Co. & Butler 
Indep. Union, 167 N.L.R.B. 308, 308 (1967)). 
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explicit expression of a purpose to represent employees is sufficient as a matter 
of law to establish labor organization status. 
It is difficult to reconcile Coinmach with ROC-NY.  The explicit “dealing 
with” purpose evidence in the latter was much greater than the evidence in the 
former.  Such sharp inconsistency may not go unnoticed by courts in the context 
of secondary boycotts.  Courts in secondary boycott cases may utilize the 
NLRB’s representational cases to find ALT-labor groups “labor organizations” 
by virtue of the groups’ express statements of “dealing with” purpose. 
2.  “Dealing With” Purpose Inferred from Protest 
Perhaps this much is clear: an ALT-labor protest with no “dealing with” or 
bargaining purpose and with no “bilateral mechanism” involved should not be 
adequate in itself to render an ALT-labor group a “labor organization.”  The 
difficulty is that protest may create discussion leading to consideration of how 
much dialogue would be required to establish a bilateral mechanism or a “pattern 
and practice” of interaction and consideration of proposals.  Assuming, however, 
an ALT-labor group is solely protesting employer practices, its “message” 
appears more like a unilateral demand and less like any form of bilateral 
discussion or invitation to engage in bargaining.  In the posture of protest, the 
group’s demand is as much a message to the general public about the targeted 
employer’s practices as it is a communication to the employer with which it has 
a dispute. 
Courts have previously utilized avoidance canons when interpreting portions 
of the NLRA that might have rendered predominantly expressive activity 
unlawful under the statute.146  Indeed, there are a number of “publicity provisos” 
built into the statute that operate in practice as a kind of constitutional safety 
valve.147  Broadly interpreting the labor organization definition in such a way as 
to convert social advocacy groups into labor organizations subject to NLRA 
injunction carries obvious chilling potential.  Therefore, courts may in protest 
contexts interpret the definition of “labor organization” narrowly once it is clear 
that there is no union activity involved. 
a.  Center for United Labor Action 
This avoidance rationale may respond to an objection raised by commentator 
David Rosenfeld: that something akin to protest may in fact be deemed a form 
of “dealing with.”148  Rosenfeld recounts the case of Center for United Labor 
Action & Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co.149 in which the Center for United Labor 
Action (CULA), arguably an NLRA labor organization, was found by the NLRB 
                                                            
 146. See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 
485 U.S. 568, 576–78 (1988). 
 147. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(i)(B) (2006). 
 148. Rosenfeld, supra note 2, at 485–86. 
 149. 219 NLRB 873 (1975). 
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not to be such an organization.150  The question was of threshold importance 
because the charging party, Sibley, a retail-clothing store in Rochester, New 
York, alleged that CULA was engaged in a secondary boycott against it.151  The 
primary employer, it was alleged, was Farah Manufacturing, a clothing 
manufacturer, which was involved in a nationwide labor dispute with the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (the ACWA).152  The charge was 
filed against both the CULA and the ACWA.153  The ACWA, an admitted 
NLRA labor organization, quickly and predictably settled the case, after the 
NLRB found administratively that it had engaged in an unlawful secondary 
boycott.154  CULA, which became involved in the labor dispute once it was clear 
that the ACWA was meeting with little success, declined to settle, and the 
secondary boycott case went to trial.155  The question presented was whether 
CULA was a “labor organization” so as to bring it within the ambit of the 
NLRA’s secondary boycott provisions.  The NLRB found that it was not.156 The 
decision is explainable by reference to constitutional avoidance principles if it is 
accepted that there was a substantial argument that a putative labor organization 
was engaging in predominantly expressive activity. 
What did CULA do?  Well, to begin with, unlike much of ALT-labor,157 
CULA defined itself as a defender of unions and as an aggressive supporter of 
the union cause.158  It supported union strikes.159  It engaged in picketing other 
retailers carrying Farah’s products, participating directly in the union campaign, 
and across state lines.160  It even assisted striking employees of other unionized 
employers involved in wholly separate labor disputes.161  In sum, it was engaged 
in a broad variety of activities in these disputes, including representing 
discharged workers before the state unemployment commission in opposition to 
                                                            
 150. Id. at 873. 
 151. Id. at 876. 
 152. Id. 
 153. See id. at 874. 
 154. Id. at 876. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 873. 
 157. This is beginning to change in the fast food worker context and one increasingly sees 
those ALT-labor workers advocating explicitly for a union.  For example, in a new wave of rallies, 
strikes, and protests by thousands of fast food workers on September 4, 2014, the workers carried 
signs and chanted slogans for “15 and a union.”  Seth Freed Wessler, ‘We’re a Movement Now’: 
Fast Food Workers Strike in 150 Cities, NBC NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014, 4:46 AM), 
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/in-plain-sight/were-movement-now-fast-food-workers-strike-
150-cities-n195256. 
 158. Id. at 877. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
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an employer’s position, and assisting employees at a plant who wanted to 
unionize.162 
However, CULA’s primary activity was picketing,163 albeit in a manner that 
would almost certainly violate the NLRA if it were a labor organization.  In 
connection with the labor organization question, it was quite evident that 
employees participated in CULA.164  It was equally evident, however, that 
despite all of the labor organization-like activity in the record, CULA never 
attempted to negotiate or communicate with Sibley.165  It had solely engaged in 
protest activity.  The question for the administrative law judge (ALJ) hearing the 
case was whether by engaging in concerted activities or assisting and persuading 
employees to do so, CULA was “dealing with” Sibley.166  Despite finding that 
CULA’s activity rendered it an NLRA labor organization,167 the ALJ 
nevertheless refused to find a secondary boycott violation because “such a result 
tends to warp the structure and distort the policy and purposes of the Act.”168  
Sibley argued that such a conclusion would encourage “outside organizations” 
to engage in secondary boycotts.169 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the NLRB on appeal did not adopt the reasoning of 
the ALJ insofar as he found CULA to be a labor organization, although it did 
uphold his finding of no violation.170  The NLRB concluded that the ALJ 
erroneously equated support for a “social cause” with the desire to represent 
individuals in pursuit of a social cause.171  In rejecting the ALJ’s reasoning the 
NLRB said, “[s]upport for a cause, no matter how active it may become, does 
not rise to the level of representation unless it can be demonstrated that the 
organization in question is expressly or implicitly seeking to deal with the 
employer over matters affecting the employees.”172 
It might be true that the NLRB majority was applying extra-statutory criteria, 
or even an incorrect standard altogether, when it additionally opined that “to 
qualify as a labor organization under our Act the organization must be selected 
and designated by employees for the purpose of resolving their conflicts with 
employers . . . .”173  The labor organization doctrine as it exists today does not 
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support the NLRB’s proposition.  The gist of the opinion, however, seems to be 
that defining a labor organization as the ALJ did would embroil the Act in 
interpretive difficulties.  Notably, at that time, the NLRB did not yet have the 
benefit of labor-specific avoidance canon cases like Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. 
v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction Trades Council174 and NLRB v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,175 which emphasized in the context of the NLRA 
that “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious 
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such 
problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of 
Congress.”176  To hold that an activist group is a NLRA labor organization 
merely because it protests repeatedly and employees participate, and thereby to 
expose the group to civil liability for peaceful expressive activity, appears to 
activate this principle.177 
It is worth noting that some commentary on Center for United Labor Action 
at the time of the decision claimed that the case stood for the proposition that 
almost any group admitting employees to its membership, including broader 
civil society protest groups, might constitute a labor organization.178  Even 
outside the confines of Center for United Labor Action, some scholars at that 
time assumed that all kinds of groups might be labor organizations.  For 
example, one commentator argued in connection with the celebrated case 
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization179 that the 
dissident group of minority employees in opposition to the incumbent union in 
that case was itself probably a labor organization.180  Such a contention may 
                                                            
 174. 485 U.S. 568 (1988). 
 175. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
 176. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp., 485 U.S. at 575. 
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 178. See, e.g., Comment, Protest Groups and Labor Disputes-Toward a Definition of Labor 
Organization: Center for United Labor Action, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 796, 801–02 (1976) 
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 179. 420 U.S. 50 (1975). 
 180. See Protest Groups, supra note 178, at 800 & n.33.  The employees engaged in protest 
activities in a manner that was at odds with the incumbent union in the workplace, and the 
employees were fired.  Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 53–55.  The Supreme Court ultimately 
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strike twenty-first century readers as odd.  It would seem to follow that the 
minority dissident group, in addition to being denied the protection by section 7 
of the NLRA, may additionally have been capable of violating section 8(b). 
b.  Waugh Chapel South 
Perhaps such an avoidance policy was also operating sub silentio in the Fourth 
Circuit’s Waugh Chapel South, LCC v. United Food & Commercial Workers 
Union Local 27181 opinion.  In that case, a commercial real estate developer of a 
shopping center in Anne Arundel County, Maryland planned to lease a storefront 
unit to Wegmans Food Markets.182  The United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union and the Mid-Atlantic Retail Food Industry Joint Labor Management Fund 
opposed the project because the supermarket was not unionized.183  A union 
official allegedly threatened to oppose any future projects of the developer in 
which the supermarket would be a tenant.184  Because the union’s dispute was 
with the supermarket, the developer was a neutral party to the labor dispute.  The 
union and the fund subsequently filed fourteen legal challenges to the project.185  
Each of the challenges was dismissed, withdrawn, or mooted by subsequent 
developments.186 
The developer, thereafter, sued the union and the fund in federal district court 
under the NLRA, arguing that the legal challenges filed against it as a neutral 
party were a sham, and thus a form of secondary boycott.187  The court held that 
while sham litigation could violate the secondary boycott provisions of the 
NLRA and a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the union had 
engaged in such conduct,188 the court determined that the fund was not a “labor 
organization” subject to the NLRA.189  The court noted that in order to fall under 
the NLRA’s definition of labor organization, an entity must meet the “dealing 
with employers” requirement, and that neither the purpose nor the activity of the 
fund involved “dealing with” employers.190  In coming to this conclusion, the 
court cited circuit precedent holding that no labor organization status may be 
applied in the absence of a bilateral mechanism through which “there is a 
‘pattern or practice’ over time of employee proposals concerning working 
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bargaining representative.  Id. at 71–73. 
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 182. Id. at 357. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 358. 
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conditions, coupled with management consideration thereof . . . .”191  The court, 
in other words, applied the NLRB’s interpretive formulation from cases like E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co. & Chemical Workers Ass’n192 and Electromation, 
Inc. & International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local Union No. 1049,193 and 
placed significant emphasis on the fact that the fund’s charter explicitly 
prohibited it from “‘participating directly or indirectly . . . in union collective 
activities.’”194 
The conclusion is puzzling because the fund was involved in the alleged sham 
litigation with the union, and therefore participating directly in union activities 
in violation of its charter.  This was the same litigation that the court said 
rendered the union potentially liable to a secondary boycott violation.195 
One could certainly argue that the fund’s actions in violation of its charter 
made its subsequent characterization of its organizational purposes suspect.  It 
could also be argued that a series of legal actions between the contractor and the 
fund (an organization in which employees participated) amounted to a bilateral 
mechanism in which proposals between employer and group were exchanged, 
such as settlement proposals and demand.  Nevertheless, the court concluded 
that: 
the only fact suggesting any interactions between the Fund and an 
employer concern[ed] the alleged secondary boycott. There is plainly 
no “bilateral mechanism” when the only alleged contact between an 
employee entity and management is an unfair labor practice directed 
against an employer.196 
It seems reasonable to speculate that the court was anxiously dismissive of the 
argument that the fund was a labor organization because it faced a difficult 
question involving whether alleged sham litigation could violate the secondary 
boycott provisions of the NLRA.  On the merits of the case, the court was unsure 
about the appropriate “sham legal action” standard to apply when multiple 
instances rather than a single incident of a sham legal action were alleged.197  In 
the context of a difficult First Amendment issue involving court access, one 
suspects the court preferred a “clean” jurisdictional posture. The labor 
organization issue, had it continued to be pressed by the fund, was not clean.  By 
dismissing the fund, the jurisdictional issue—and potentially an additional 
constitutional issue—was avoided. 
                                                            
 191. Id. at 361 (citing NLRB v. Peninsula Gen. Hosp. Med. Cent., 36 F.3d 1262, 1270 (4th 
Cir. 1994)). 
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C.  The Crux of the Statutory Interpretation Problem 
Whether ALT-labor groups are NLRA labor organizations, therefore, appears 
in practice to be a function of at least three factors: (1) how a particular group 
explicitly defines its purpose, (2) a fact-finder’s inference of “dealing with” 
purpose drawn from the group’s actions, and (3) whether the group’s actions 
arguably permitting an inference of “dealing with” purpose implicate 
constitutionally-protected conduct.198  In the NLRB’s Electromation decision, 
one NLRB member noted “that Cabot Carbon’s rejection of the notion that 
‘dealing with’ is synonymous with collective bargaining failed to delineate the 
lower limits of the conduct: if ‘dealing with’ is less than bargaining, what is it 
more than?”199  The question has not yet been answered in a satisfactory manner.  
The risk faced by ALT-labor today is that the lower limits are in flux and could 
“descend” to the conduct in which it is customarily engaged. 
At the heart of the confusion may be a failure to distinguish between “internal” 
and “external” labor organization applications.  The broad labor organization 
definition was crafted with an eye to internal workplace applications.  It was 
intended to outlaw the internal “company union.”  The idea was to define labor 
organization broadly and then, through operation of section 8(a)(2) of the 
NLRA, to prevent an employer from controlling the organization.200  The 
resulting statutory formulation makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer 
“to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor 
organization or contribute financial or other support to it . . . .”201 
The question of who can violate the secondary boycott provisions, on the other 
hand, is a “labor organization” external application of Taft-Hartley, a version of 
the NLRA that was obviously not in existence when the labor organization 
definition was initially conceived.  The external application arises not in the 
context of the putative labor organization’s internal interaction with employees 
of a particular employer, but rather in the context of the organization externally 
interacting with other employers.  Cabot Carbon Co. and the NLRB’s 
subsequent interpretation of the case in internal application contexts do not 
speak to that situation.  To have any chance of placing the situation in proper 
statutory context the preferable approach is to consult Taft-Hartley’s legislative 
history. 
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In lieu of an exhaustive examination of the legislative history of the Taft-
Harley Act or the LMRDA respecting the labor organization definition,202 this 
Article explores roughly contemporaneous court decisions in secondary boycott, 
“external application” contexts.  In Di Giorgio Fruit Corp. v. NLRB,203 a case 
decided by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals a few years after the enactment of 
the Taft-Hartley Act, the court upheld the NLRB’s determination that a farm 
workers’ union could not be held liable under the NLRA’s secondary boycott 
provisions because it was comprised exclusively of agricultural workers not 
covered under the NLRA.204  Accordingly, no “employees” participated in the 
group and, by definition, the union did not qualify as an NLRA labor 
organization.205  In the course of the court’s discussion, there was no 
consideration of the different “external” circumstances to which the labor 
organization definition was being applied.206 
Soon after the enactment of the LMRDA in 1959, which amended and 
tightened the secondary boycott provisions, the D.C. Circuit addressed 
secondary boycotting in its International Organization of Masters, Mates & 
Pilots of America, Inc. v. NLRB207 decision.  The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals 
struggled with whether Masters, the involved putative labor organization, 
engaged in alleged secondary boycotting and was a statutory labor 
organization.208  The NLRB concluded that it was, and applied the secondary 
boycott provisions to the group, finding a violation.209  Masters argued that it 
could not be held responsible for an unfair labor practice as a labor organization 
because the pilots for whose benefit the secondary boycott had been affected 
were not employees under the NLRA.210  However, unlike the situation in Di 
Giorgio Fruit, some of the group’s members were statutory employees,211 
thereby satisfying the section 2(5) statutory requirement that employees must 
participate for a group to be found a labor organization.  After eventually 
concluding that Masters was a section 2(5) labor organization, the court said, 
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and little discussion about what they, in fact, were.  See Marculewicz & Thomas, supra note 84, at 
80–82.  The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act shows that some early committee drafts 
would have permitted an employer to lawfully form an employee committee provided that the 
employer would only “discuss” workplace issues with the committee.  See LeRoy, supra note 105, 
at 1704–05.  The proposal was defeated because it was assumed it was merely an attempt to legalize 
company unions.  Id. 
 203. 191 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951). 
 204. Id. at 644–48. 
 205. Id. 
 206. The court sets forth the definition without discussing its legislative origins in the Wagner 
Act.  Id. at 644. 
 207. 351 F.2d 771 (D.C. Cir. 1965). 
 208. Id. at 774. 
 209. Id. at 773. 
 210. Id. at 774. 
 211. Id. 
868 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:837 
we observe that this characterization of [Masters] as a “labor 
organization” means simply that that entity, as presently constituted, 
is such an organization for all purposes under the Act.  In other words, 
the use of the term “labor organization” in any section of the Act must 
apply to [Masters] unless some further language of the section or its 
legislative history indicates a contrary result.212 
Cases like Di Giorgio Fruit and Masters strongly suggest that courts deciding 
cases around the time of the enactment of the secondary boycott provisions did 
not view the scope of the labor organization definition as being narrowed in 
application to secondary boycotts.  That is not good news for ALT-labor, 
because it suggests that courts may find no interpretive reason arising from the 
statute to narrow the labor organization definition in “external” secondary 
boycott contexts.213 
Stefan Marculewicz and Jennifer Thomas identified one explanation for 
courts’ unwillingness to narrow interpretively the scope of the labor organization 
definition.214  As they point out, the LMRDA—which was a substantial 
amendment to the NLRA directed at, among other things, the corrupt internal 
practices of unions—arguably broadened the labor organization definition.215  
Some commentators have argued that the definition was narrowed rather than 
broadened.216  However, it seems unlikely that the secondary provisions would 
have been left unmodified if narrowing the definition had been legislatively 
contemplated, particularly in the course of tinkering with the labor organization 
definition in one part of the amended statute. 
Thus, regardless of the theoretical validity of the contention that the internal 
origins of the labor organization definition is not easily exportable to external 
circumstances, courts have not said as much and, to the contrary, seem inclined 
to adopt a universal statutory definition.  This conclusion appears especially 
troublesome for ALT-labor in the context of section 303 actions.  While the 
NLRB may continue at the administrative level to decline pursuit of section 
8(b)(4) violations involving ALT-labor on the “pattern and practice” theory, 
what the federal courts will do with the labor organization definition in the 
context of secondary boycott cases is anyone’s guess.  Although the courts have 
been quite clear that individuals may not be sued under section 303,217 the courts 
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make no distinction between unions and other kinds of labor organizations.  
Indeed, there appear to be no cases discussing Cabot Carbon Co. or the NLRB’s 
pattern or practice theory in the context of a section 303 action. 
If an attorney were representing an ALT-labor group contemplating an 
arguable secondary boycott, he or she would be unable to predict with 
confidence whether his or her client would be deemed a labor organization by 
the NLRB or by a federal district court.  The best counsel would probably be 
that the NLRB would likely not issue an administrative complaint or seek a 10(l) 
injunction in connection with an ALT-labor secondary boycott.  To make that 
outcome more likely, the attorney should warn against: (1) setting up durable 
bilateral mechanisms for interacting with employers, (2) establishing any 
sustained negotiations with specific employers, or (3) focusing on individual 
companies in broader campaigns.218  Yet avoiding these three actions would not 
overcome an explicit statement in the group’s charter or mission statements that 
the group exists for the purpose of dealing with employers over statutory 
subjects.  However, Cabot Carbon Co.’s undefined lower limits of conduct for 
the establishment of labor organization status stands like a shadowy sentry 
continually calling into question whether the above advice would carry the day. 
Its lower boundaries could reach all the way to conferral of labor organization 
status in a section 303 action. 
III.  TOWARD A “LABOR ORGANIZATION” BARGAIN 
ALT-labor—indeed, all of labor—should understand the considerable risk to 
nascent labor groups embedded in traditional labor law.  Both unions and non-
traditional labor advocates have been eager to avoid traditional labor law 
because of its well-known deficiencies in adequately protecting the exercise of 
concerted employee rights, especially during traditional representational 
election campaigns.219  The question for the labor movement now is not whether 
it should avoid traditional labor law because of its notoriously inadequate 
protective shield, but whether the labor movement can avoid labor law as a 
sword.220  The simple truth is that traditional labor law imposes significant 
restraints on labor organizations, including the secondary boycott prohibitions 
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discussed in this Article221 and the fact that many ALT-labor groups almost 
certainly fall within the labor organization definition.222 
However, there is an opportunity for both labor and business.  Devised in the 
1930s as an important part of the original NLRA, the broad labor organization 
definition was originally meant to ward off the early 1930s employer tactic of 
creating puppet, in-house unions to distract employee interest in authentic 
unions.223  The statutory strategy was to define labor organizations very broadly 
and then to strictly prohibit employer involvement in them.224  The present 
iteration of ALT-labor may be merely the tip of the proverbial iceberg with 
respect to people who have simply “had enough” organizing themselves into 
non-traditional or even unrecognizable kinds of groupings. 
In all types of workplaces, non-union employees routinely initiate concerted 
protest online, and the NLRB has in several cases acted to protect such 
activity.225  Imagine a group of cyber protesters who, angry with their company, 
electronically attempt to persuade other workers employed by other 
companies—say customers of their company—not to go to work to pressure 
their company to agree to their demands.226  The cyber group could be found a 
labor organization and it might have violated secondary boycott prohibitions. 
Even more broadly, one can conceive of low-wage workers as simply the front 
edge of a rapidly expanding precariat.  As commentator Katherine Stone wrote, 
increasingly “workers are hired on temporary or fixed term contracts, without 
any hope of regular employment.  The new ‘precariat’ move in and out of the 
labor market, earning low wages when they have work, and putting strains on 
public welfare and health care systems when they do not.”227 
Policy makers’ usual reaction to developments such as these is to argue that 
the regulatory state should become more flexible to accommodate the new 
                                                            
 221. See supra Part I. 
 222. See supra Part II. 
 223. LeRoy, supra note 105, at 1654–55. 
 224. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (2006) (providing it is an unfair labor practice for an employer 
“to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or 
contribute financial or other support to it”). 
 225. See Steven Greenhouse, Even if it Enrages Your Boss, Social Net Speech is Protected, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2013, at A1. 
 226. See Martin H. Malin & Henry H Perritt, Jr., The National Labor Relations Act in 
Cyberspace: Union Organizing in Electronic Workplaces, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (hinting 
at this emerging problem by noting that among the questions that will be considered are the types 
of economic pressure that may lawfully be brought to bear on all-electronic workplaces).  One 
might add that both the questions of primary and secondary pressure will have to be considered.  It 
is extremely easy to imagine unintentional formation of an electronic, cyber “labor organization” 
unwittingly “dealing with” an employer and then applying secondary pressure to it. 
 227. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Green Shoots in the Labor Market: A Cornucopia of Social 
Experiments 7–10 (UCLA Sch. L., Law-Econ Research Paper No. 14-01, 2014), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2383575. See generally GUY STANDING, THE 
PRECARIAT: THE NEW DANGEROUS CLASS (2011) (explaining how this class of people creates 
economic instability). 
2014] A Labor Organization Bargain 871 
economic reality.228  However, there is nothing new about this reality.  It was 
the reality of the nineteenth century, a reality that forward-thinking policy 
makers and an energetic, organized working class was able to alter.  The question 
is whether unions wish to accept a world of flexibility or create a world of 
stability, as did their forbearers, by assisting pockets of resistance, even if it 
means risking changes in a statutory regime that has become more talismanic 
than real. 
Unions can diminish concern respecting modification of the labor 
organization definition by thinking horizontally.  The concerns associated with 
dominated committees—internal employee committees arguably “dealing with” 
employers respecting conditions of employment—arose during a time when 
there was some prospect of an intra-workplace struggle, a vertical contest over 
control of continuing employment.  Now, however, unions will be more likely 
to turn to the business of what might be called “serial organizing.”  Serial 
organizing recognizes that workers will increasingly be moving quickly, from 
insecure job to insecure job.  It makes little sense for a union to expend resources 
to organize workers in ephemeral workplaces.  Rather, organization will most 
efficiently be undertaken between workplaces, guiding, educating, and 
“connecting up” workers as they themselves engage in quick, sharp conflicts 
with their precariat employers.229 
A recent labor dispute illustrates this idea.  On January 28, 2014, a worker at 
a Whole Foods grocery store in Chicago missed work when she had to stay home 
with her special needs child because school was cancelled as a result of a 
snowstorm.230  The woman and her co-workers, none of whom were represented 
by a union, believed that they had previously negotiated an attendance policy 
agreement with their employer that would have excused the woman under its 
terms.231  However, the woman was fired, and her co-workers walked off the job 
in protest.232  One of the employees interviewed in connection with the job action 
said, 
[w]e’re not “union workers” in the sense that we don’t have a 
contract—we certainly would like to have one eventually. . . .  But the 
reality is that the union is you deciding with your co-workers to 
                                                            
 228. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 227, at 7–10. 
 229. As this Article goes to print, it appears that the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU) is beginning to get the idea.  In July 2014, SEIU sponsored a convention of 1200 fast food 
employees in an expo center west of Chicago.  Steven Greenhouse, Fast-Food Workers Intensify 
Fight for $15 an Hour, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2014, at B1.  Reportedly, the union has recently 
injected 15 million dollars into the fast food worker controversies broadly across the industry. Id. 
 230. Josh Eidelson, That’s Cold, Whole Foods: Polar Vortex Firing Spurs Chicago Strike, 
SALON (Feb. 5, 2014, 9:42 AM), http://www.salon.com/2014/02/05/thats_cold_whole_foods_ 
polar_vortex_firing_spurs_chicago_strike/. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
872 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:837 
actually join together and exert collective power against the boss.  
That’s what the essence of a union is.233 
After the walkout, Chicago Teachers Union President Karen Lewis headlined 
a supportive rally that was organized by the Workers Organizing Committee of 
Chicago.234 
This story illustrates that workers are capable of independent, smaller-scale 
organizing at their own discrete workplaces and of conceptualizing, in broad 
terms, collective power.  Additionally, unions are capable of connecting with 
those workers afterwards.235  However, it also illustrates some of the 
coordination risks under discussion in this Article.  The magazine article from 
which the story is recounted does not mention the location of the rally, the 
message of the rally participants, or to whom the message was directed.  As 
discussed above, these inquiries would be critical in assessing whether an 
employer could allege a secondary boycott.236 
Some have argued that sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) should simply be eliminated 
because the interplay of the provisions leaves employees, as a practical matter, 
with a choice between unionized participation in workplace governance and no 
participation at all.237  Professor Clyde Summers has argued, however, that if 
section 8(a)(2) were eliminated, it would set the stage for massive employer anti-
union campaigns and the establishment of sham unions that employees would 
be poorly equipped to identify.238  A similar outcome might be produced, of 
course, if section 2(5)’s labor organization definition were narrowed in some 
manner to cover “a certified union” or a “union representing employees,” or 
something of the sort.  A narrower definition might mean that employers could 
establish and dominate non-labor organizations not fitting into the narrower 
definition, thereby deceiving employees into thinking they have independent 
representation when they do not. 
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Exception to Section 8(a)(2), 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 140–41 (1993) (discussing and rejecting 
the views of those who advocate the sections’ elimination). 
 238. Id. at 141. 
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To contend with this problem, some propose a modified section 8(a)(2) that 
would ban employers from installing organizations “that purport to function as 
the independent collective agency of the workers,” but would in all other 
respects permit business-related employee participation schemes.239  Such a 
modification might simultaneously narrow the applicability of section 2(5), 
possibly having the practical effect of rescuing ALT-labor from secondary 
boycott liability.  However, when considering such modifications, there is no 
escaping the continuing risk of employee deception engendered by relaxation of 
the section 2(5) labor organization definition if section 8(a)(2) is simultaneously 
weakened. 
Labor-sympathetic commentators have also argued for the elimination of 
section 8(b)(4) altogether.  Professor Julius Getman has contended, for example 
that, 
[s]ection 8(b)(4) places massive and unique limitations upon the 
ability of unions to use economic pressure to support each other’s 
strikes.  No one doubts that its repeal would be a great victory for 
unions and that legislative achievement of this goal has been long 
sought and almost impossible to achieve.240 
That may be true, but such a thing seemed practically impossible a decade 
ago, and is virtually unthinkable in the present ossified reality.  Similarly, 
employers have had an intense interest for over a decade in modifying or 
abolishing section 8(a)(2) or section 2(5) of the NLRA, or both, and this interest 
culminated in the passage of the Teamwork for Employees and Management Act 
(TEAM) in 1995,241 a bill that was ultimately vetoed by Bill Clinton.242  While 
the TEAM Act, or something like it, has had its supporters over the years, it is 
just as obvious that it cannot pass in the current political environment as it is that 
secondary boycott liability for unions will not be eliminated. 
                                                            
 239. Samuel Estreicher, Employee Involvement and the “Company Union” Prohibition: The 
Case for Partial Repeal of Section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 125, 127 (1994). 
 240. Julius Getman, National Labor Relations Act: What Went Wrong; Can We Fix It?, 45 
B.C. L. REV. 125, 140 (2003). 
 241. H.R. REP. NO. 104-743, at 1 (1995); S. REP. NO. 104-295, at 2 (1996).  Section 3 of the 
Bill would have amended section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA as follows: 
Provided further, that it shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice 
under this paragraph for an employer to establish, assist, maintain, or participate in any 
organization or entity of any kind, in which employees participate, to address matters of 
mutual interest, including issues of quality, productivity and efficiency, and which does 
not have, claim, or seek authority to negotiate or enter into collective bargaining 
agreements with the employer or to amend existing collective bargaining agreements 
between the employer and any labor organization. 
S. REP. NO. 104-295.  Although the Bill would have amended section 8(a)(2), the language would 
also effectively have amended section 2(5). 
 242. Rafael Gely, Whose Team are You On?  My Team or my TEAM?: The NLRA’s Section 
8(a)(2) and the TEAM Act, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 325 n.4 (1997). 
874 Catholic University Law Review [Vol. 63:837 
It would be hard to argue that the present environment is not more polarized 
than it was during the Clinton Administration.  The surprisingly underdeveloped 
and unpredictable law surrounding the labor organization definition explored in 
this Article, and in the work of leading commentators like Eli Naduris-
Weismann, leads to the conclusion that some present and future ALT-labor 
groups may be found to be labor organizations and some may not.  However, the 
likelihood of litigation over the labor organization question is not so 
unpredictable.  As things stand now, it is easy to imagine secondary boycott 
cases being decided one way at the NLRB and in an entirely different manner in 
the federal courts, for example in the course of section 303 actions.  That kind 
of uncertainty does not seem desirable for anyone. 
Those outside of business circles opposed to unions on policy grounds might 
also support a re-worked labor organization definition for reasons other than the 
reflexive rationale that it could increase opportunities for employers to establish 
participatory committees.  A libertarian argument in support of ALT-labor has 
been under discussion recently: ALT-labor, whatever it is, represents a labor 
relations model outside the “compulsory unionism” that conservatives and 
libertarians tend to deride.  If we conceive of union unfair labor practices as the 
Taft-Hartley policy counterweight to exclusive representation and employee-
funded unions, ALT-labor is outside that paradigm.  It does not enjoy 
governmental, exclusive representation protection.243 
In the NLRA regime (as in any functioning political democracy), the majority 
rules and achieves governmental status, and that is in theory the end of the 
matter.  Any non-majority, non-supporting employee interests are to yield and 
to support financially the union to the limits of a representational ceiling.  As 
one is often told in discussions of employment at will, one is always “free” to 
quit.244  This is a rational, if sometimes scorned, free-rider policy.  ALT-labor—
though it is hard to speak of it monolithically—appears to be entirely voluntary 
under any reasonable definition of the term.  No employee is required to join or 
support it as a condition of employment.  Arguably, then, it represents a “free 
market” alternative to unionism, even if it is unclear whether it is an actual 
alternative since at this early date it has not delivered much more than positive 
public relations for low-wage workers.  Still, such groups seem evocative of a 
certain nineteenth century élan, a panache that might have been embraced by 
Samuel Gompers and the “libertarians” of his day.245  These groups are 
supported substantially by private money and not in any meaningful way by the 
State. 
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Labor advocates will continue to see threats to unions’ bargaining exclusivity 
in attempts to loosen the section 2(5) and 8(a)(2) lockboxes.  There are two 
immediate responses to this concern.  First, either unions want to help ALT-
labor or they do not.  If they want to help, they will have to eventually address 
the labor organization vulnerability discussed in this Article.  Second, if the 
underlying dynamic of the labor relationship is fundamentally adversarial and 
inevitable, unions have nothing to fear from non-union participatory schemes.  
The model cannot lead anywhere under that assumption because, at the end of 
the day, the boss will not give up anything significantly affecting the bottom 
line.  Once workers are organized in their “action committees,” and see what is 
not happening, they may be more inclined to wonder what happens next, than if 
they had never been in such a group.  Unions might find themselves in a good 
position to call the participatory bluff and dare management to allow authentic 
competition between unions and committees.  Perhaps unions will find ways to 
access employees participating in internal groups to help them leverage an 
ongoing credible threat of independent unionism.246  This may sharpen unions 
and employees alike in an even broader “School for Democracy,”247 and put to 
rest conservative claims that unions fear competition and insist upon 
monopoly.248  Given the overall weakness of labor law, what do unions really 
have to lose? 
The time seems opportune for a compromise.  Organized labor and businesses 
should push jointly for a narrowing of the section 2(5) definition and make 
certain that the definition means in practice that the now-and-future ALT-labor 
is not subject to liability under the secondary boycott provisions of the NLRA.  
Michael LeRoy has proposed the following amendment to section 8(a)(2): 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Section, it shall not 
constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice for an employer 
to form or maintain a committee in which employees participate to at 
least the same extent practicable as representatives of management 
participate to discuss with it matters of mutual interest, including 
grievances, wages, hours of employment and other working 
conditions, and which does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the 
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to enter into 
collective bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor 
organization, except that in a case in which a labor organization is the 
                                                            
 246. See LeRoy, supra note 105, at 1702 (discussing the Canadian experience and how 
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 247. See Garden, supra note 177, at 2657. 
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representative of such employees as provided in section 9(a), this 
proviso shall not apply.249 
This language, which essentially keeps intact the broad definition of a labor 
organization, but partially insulates the employer from violations in connection 
with it, should be accepted.  However, we should go further to clarify that the 
conceptual structure identified in the language that would seem to include much 
of ALT-labor—a group that “does not have, claim, or seek authority to be the 
exclusive bargaining representative of the employees or to enter into collective 
bargaining agreements between the employer and any labor organization”—is 
similarly insulated from liability under section 8(b)(4)(B). 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The transparent reasons for the emergence of ALT-labor groups are the reality 
of weak labor law protections for employees and the broad formation of a 
transient precariat.  In this environment, unions have been unable to gain 
traction.  But labor law, with all its weaknesses and maddening irrelevance in 
certain contexts, has prohibitory dimensions that must not be ignored.  For some 
observers, ALT-labor represents the potential for a reinvigorated labor 
movement and an energized precariat.  For others, ALT-labor represents, at least 
with respect to low wage workers, an exercise in futility—no amount of 
pressure, they claim, will force employers to pay wages and benefits that the 
market simply will not bear.  To an observer of labor history, however, ALT-
labor is a vulnerable, fragile phenomenon likely to be dealt with—if agitation 
intensifies—as militant labor has always been dealt with in the United States: 
suppression through injunctions and civil actions.  Secondary boycott 
prohibitions are an engine that could possibly drive such litigation.  Workers 
flouting secondary boycott prohibitions would be engaging in civil 
disobedience.  Civil disobedience will always have its risks and costs, but 
defiance in the face of the risk is a course some might choose.250  However, the 
risks should be understood.  Communicating the nature of the risk is not arguing 
against its legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, the pragmatic conclusion of this Article is that ALT-labor 
groups would be well advised to disavow in explicit terms any purpose of 
negotiating with employers.  The better course is to train workers in discrete 
workplaces how they can engage in negotiations.  Such a disavowal should 
diminish, but not eliminate, arguments that an ALT-labor group’s purpose is to 
“deal with” employers.  It would have to be followed by conduct from which a 
                                                            
 249. LeRoy, supra note 105, at 1708–09.  As Professor LeRoy explains, the proposal is an 
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“pattern and practice” of interacting with employers was found insufficiently 
pervasive for a legal fact finder to discover a “bilateral mechanism.”  It is 
reasonable to think that courts will not be quick to equate “pure” protest directed 
at an employer with a “dealing with” purpose sufficient to create labor 
organization status, thereby exposing ALT-labor to secondary boycott liability.  
Thus, ALT-labor should be careful to direct its protest message to the general 
public wherever possible. 
More broadly, “outside” civil society groups are becoming increasingly 
invested in ALT-labor, which represents one face of the precariat.  Restricting 
ALT-labor conduct that might, if engaged in by a union, violate the NLRA is an 
altogether different exercise than regulating “industrial strife.”  One hopes that 
such restrictions would be undertaken, if at all, only with the greatest caution 
and subjected to strict scrutiny.  A good way to avoid impacts on the broader 
civil society is to ensure that ALT-labor is not subjected to the secondary boycott 
provisions of the NLRA.  Whether or not organized labor and business can 
negotiate some kind of deal that Congress would be willing to accept and enact 
through legislation, it is in the broader public interest that the government not be 
permitted to further conflate traditional labor regulation with historically 
protected speech and protest. 
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